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1 Abstract
This thesis investigate how the Danish Comprehensive Approach, a foreign development 
and security policy created in 2004, are employed by privileged actors in the public 
discourse, as well as through the policy papers. In doing so the thesis apply Jennifer 
Milliken's (1999) discursive approach of deconstruction of the policy papers from 2004 
till 2012, and several grey paper articles and features. In understanding and categorising 
the contested and well debated security-development nexus, the thesis apply the mapping 
of Maria Stern and Joakim Öjendal (2010). This map contains a number of different 
narratives,  in  which  the  Danish  Comprehensive  Approach  can  be  applied.  The 
deconstructed  discourses  are  applied  through  methods  of  discursive  subjugated 
knowledge. The result is, that discourses can be positioned in several places on the map, 
at the same time, and the between the two discourses are a small dissonance
2
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2 Initiation
In 2004 in connection with the Danish national Defence Settlement a policy called the 
Danish Comprehensive Approach (DCA)1 was launched to insure a closer cooperation 
between civilian and military actors in resolution of military engagements. The DCA was 
to become the cornerstone of the public Danish foreign policy in years to come.
The DCA was created in 2004, almost two and three years respectively into the Iraq war 
and the Afghan war2. The policy was reviewed and evaluated in 2008 by Danish Institute 
for International Studies (DIIS) commissioned by the Danish government. In 2012 the 
government by Minister of Foreign Affairs Villy Søvndal and Defence Minister Nick 
Hækkerup,  called  for  yet  another  evaluation  of  the DCA. (Politiken 20.08.12)  “The 
civil-military  cooperation  [in  the  Helmand  province] has  been  characterised  by 
emergency solutions, which we could have done without, and which definitely in some  
cases  have  failed”  Quote  by  Christian  Friis  Bach  former  Minister  of  Development 
(Politiken 21.08.12)
In  December  2012 a  short  series  of  radio  programmes  were  broadcasted  by Danish 
Broadcasting  Corporation   Programme  1,  to  shed  light  on  the  Danish  civilian  and 
military cooperation, specifically in content of the Danish engagement in, and off the 
coast of, Somalia. The programme was called “Brobyggerne”, an evocative description 
and self-image of  a  curious effort  to  merge security and development  in  the Danish 
foreign policy.  The political  agenda for  bridging this  gap,  is  the DCA. In this  radio 
programme  the  investigative  journalist,  Frank  Esmann,  discuss  with  Peter  Viggo 
Jakobsen3 whether  the  cooperation  and  coordination  between  soldiers  and  NGOs, 
emergency aid and development workers, are a desired policy in Denmark or not. The 
public perception gathered through Esmann is in the summative bit,  that;  “They [the  
ministers] say, that the comprehensive approach is a good thing, and e.g. Somalia is a  
place to develop it [DCA] … and it can only be understood in a way, where Danish  
soldiers and aid workers, are on the ground, working together”. The contrary perception 
is  told  by  Jakobsen; “...The  Danish  Comprehensive  Approach,  as  it  originally  was  
1 ”Samtænkningsinitiativet”
2 Denmark entered the wars in respectively 2003 and 2002
3 Professor from the University of Copenhagen and the Defence Academy
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conceived [i.e.  with soldiers  and aid workers  on the  ground together]  is  dead as  a  
doornail … And no resources are being allocated to this.” (Brobyggerne 1 2012)
”In addition there is an exceedingly sharp criticism of a foreign and security political,  
and development assistance establishment, who speak of new realism, bridge building,  
comprehensive approach, yet no one have been able to create tangible substance to the  
concepts.”
(Esmann in Brobyggerne 1 2012)
Clearly the policy, even after nine years, is not preforming as is expected of it.
3 Research Field
The Danish Comprehensive Approach is a political manifestation of a paradigm shift 
within security and development studies and practices over the last couple of decades. 
This paradigm has been framed as “the security-development nexus”, and it has become 
an integrated part of the foreign policy agenda in a number of organisations and states 
alike around the world. Most major foreign policies include an element of the security-
development nexus through either an overall  world view or civil-military cooperation 
schemes.  “Some leading Western donors have developed initiatives to that effect, such  
as  Canada,  with its  Human Security  Program, and the UK, with its  Security  Sector  
Reform Strategy” (Fitz-Gerald 2004: 3). As formulated in a Danish policy paper; ”The 
approach  is  found  in  different  variations:  Whole  of  Government  (OECD/DAC,  UK,  
Canada), Whole of System (EU), Integrated Approach and Whole of UN (UN), as well as  
Comprehensiv Approach (NATO)” (Peace and stabilisation 2010: 6). Although the origin 
of the nexus is contested, a couple of major spikes in the realisation of a nexus can be 
seen with in UN's “Agenda for Peace” by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
in 1992 (Schnabel 2012; Boutros-Ghali 1992) where the use of UN mandated peace-
keeping missions was launched, and the policy agenda subsequent to the USA foreign 
policy doctrine adaptation after 20014, where the reasons for security threats towards the 
USA, were to be found in underdevelopment abroad (Stokke 2006; Schnable 2012). 
4 The Bush doctrine weighs heavily on the issues of underdevelopment and insecurity.
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The security-development nexus is, as stated above, an increasing interplay of security 
and development. Both in international politics and in the scholarly field.  This merging 
of development and security emerged in security and development studies in the 90's as a 
results of the end of the Cold War, and the withering of the bipolarity in international 
politics.  David Chandler (2007) describes it  as a result  of the development of social 
constructivism especially in security studies literature which; “appears to capture the  
fluidity  of  policy-making  and  the  seemingly  free-floating  nature  of  the  concept  of  
“security”  since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War.” (Chandler  2007:  379).  Mark  Duffield 
describes it as a result of liberal peace whereas new wars since the end of the Cold War 
were  results  of  “poverty,  communication  breakdown,  resource  competition,  social  
exclusion, criminality and so on” (Duffield 2001: 13). The focus changed from a static 
perception where security was bound to the nation state and the physically borders of 
these, to a more fluid view on security and of course insecurity, where issues of security 
and insecurity reside beyond and within the state borders (Chatterjee 1998; Small 2011; 
Stokke 2006; Mutimer 2007).
In much the same fashion did a change occur in the way predominately the global North 
and Western states used and formulated goals of development,  targeted at  the global 
South,  and  what  is  generally  seen  as  the  developing  world.  As  a  part  of  the 
decolonisation, development through state-building was used to secure economic growth 
and political consolidation (Simon 1999).  “The state  was the sovereign key actor and  
‘guarantor’ for  development  (measured  in  economic  terms).  Importantly,  through  
‘development’ so understood, nation-states were to be invented, established, secured and  
evolved along a linear trajectory of ‘progress’, following the path forged by Europe. The  
political and economic elites were the necessary drivers of this process, and ‘trickle-
down’ was the hope for the rest. Accordingly, development was not only driven by the  
state, but also served to constitute the state.” (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 11)
During the post-colonial era in the 1960s and 1970s the effect of development as a tool 
for the developing nation-state to ascent to a modernist dream of statehood as a nation-
state,  came  under  scrutiny  for  being  an  inadequate  technology  (Schumacher  1973; 
5
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Chambers 1983). And following this scrutiny, the focus on development changed from a 
rather state-centric development to a “human development” with the focus on; “the true 
‘subjects’ of development, namely, the poor, the local, the grass roots and the voiceless” 
(Stern & Öjendal 2010: 12). The central state oriented foreign aid did not fall out of 
favour as a governmental instrument, but in terms of development assistance, did this 
shift render the location of set development indifferent. In other words did the role of  
state play a far lesser role than previously. The human development sought to strengthen 
the livelihood for the individual as a part of society rather than the society as part of a 
state, and state-building effort.
With the end of the Cold War the nature of development continued the change from state 
directed  aid,  which  supported  either  side  of  the  bipolar  world  order,  to  the  human 
development focus.  This created a neglect of the political  consolidation,  and internal 
conflicts, and uprising against predator state elites escalated (Engberg-Pedersen  2008: 
15). These escalating conflicts were increasingly seen as a result of underdevelopment.
The political rationalisation which resulted in the DCA was increasingly seen as the new 
millennium dawned. In Britain Tony Blair called for a need to intervene in Dafur, with 
the rationale that famine and instability in Africa;  “thousands of miles away lead to  
conflict, despair, mass migration and fanaticism that can effect us all. So for reasons of  
self-interest as well as morality, we can no longer turn our back on Africa”  (Duffield 
2007: 2). In Denmark the connection between security and development was also made; 
“... increase in security creates the opportunity for additional rebuilding, which likewise  
contribute to more security and so on... “ (Møller & Tørnæs 2008)
Though this is a natural conclusion to the ideological and political historical evolution, it 
does not explain why the policies are so difficult in yielding results. The reason could 
arguably  be,  that  the  policies  build  on  different  understanding  of  the  security-
development  nexus work and what  constitutes  it.  Because  even though the  security-
development  nexus  is  quite  outspoken  in  the  different  policies,  the  debate  about 
definitions and limitations of the nexus, within the academic community, does not have a 
common voice.
6
Master Thesis Lars Hededam – 2014
Mark Duffield (2001) argues that the security-development nexus is the combination of 
capitalism driven liberalism in international relations, which forces changes in societies 
as a whole including the behaviour and attitudes of the people within, in order to create 
peace and prosperity on a global  scale  (Duffield 2001).  Others,  like David Chandler 
(2007),  disregards the use security-development nexus as attempts to  remedy broken 
states, or distressed people. And that it  is in fact an instrument to create anti-foreign 
policy,  which  serves  the  domestic  constituency  instead  of  creating  solutions  in 
development as well as a new form of geopolitics within the international community.  
And  yet  others  insist  that  the  nexus  is  yet  another  manifestation  of  the  creation  of 
security  issues  in  international  politics,  which  has  no  connection  in  ontology  or  in 
solution to security. But which is used as securitisation of developmental issues (Buzan, 
Wæver & de Wilde 1998).
In  early  2010 Maria  Stern  and  Joakim Öjendal  wrote  and  introduction  in  the  peer-
reviewed  journal;  “Security  Dialogue”  issue  dedicated  to  investigating  the  security-
development nexus, from the acknowledgement that there are vast differences within the 
scholarly work and the  practitioners  implementations.  Stern and Öjendal  specifically 
recognised the complexity of the nexus,  and that it  could be understood as different 
competing academic  discourses.  On this  background they  exercised an approach of 
mapping  the  different  discursive  realities  of  the  nexus.  The  mapping  was  to  help 
clarifying the reality of the nexus,  as being both complex, liquid,  and omnipotent at 
times. This ambiguity of the field is well debated, as it should be, by different scholars.  
These scholars have different scholarly backgrounds as the field itself originates from 
other  disciplines;  namely from within security studies  and development  studies.  The 
complexity  stems  both  from the  different  ontologies  the  respectively  directions,  the 
studies  inhabit.  And as  critical  scholars  have argued,  the  different  approaches  to  the 
nexus; “...can also be seen as discursive constructions that produce the reality they seem 
to reflect, and thus serve certain purposes and interests.” (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 7). It is 
thus important when looking into the nexus to know which distinct reality the nexus 
produces.
7
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The approach that  Stern and Öjendal  take is  that  there  is  a;  “Widespread discourse 
[which] tells the story that everybody knows what the security-development nexus is all  
about, yet no one seem to have the same collective understanding when it comes down to  
it, making the nexus a possible cover for all and any political agenda and approach.” 
(Stern  & Öjendal  2010:  8)  They recognise  that  the  nexus  is  a  real  thing  insofar  as 
attention, policies, and initiatives are concerned, in fact there is no shortage in this area, 
however these may differ in character and intentions. That the reality of the nexus is  
closely linked a constructivist view of the nexus, which hold the possibility of a number 
of different realities being socially constructed and reproduced. The mapping creates an 
illustrative description of different scholarly traditions trajectories from outside, or on 
the rim, of a nexus involving security and development issues, to a position somewhere 
within the nexus itself. However these trajectories of traditions does not always occupy 
the same position in the nexus, hence the difference and disputes in understandings. That 
the nexus encompasses different realities is evident in the academic dispute itself. But 
Stern and Öjendal do not recognise this  distortion within the academic debate of the 
nexus as a failure of a united field of study. Instead they seek to illuminate the different 
positions within the field,  as they formulate it;  “whereas ‘consensus’  should not be  
expected or even desired in intellectual debates, it remains nonetheless underexplored  
how ‘the  nexus’ is  differently  experienced,  imbued  with  meaning  and  ultimately  
employed.” (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 7). The complexity of the nexus is not a weakness, 
but rather a sign of academic health, but without some categorisation and understanding 
of the different positions within the field, along with the political realities attached to 
their positions, the nexus becomes a confusion to the academic work and a harbinger of 
real  life  shortcomings  to  policy makers  and practitioners.  If  the  DCA is  part  of  the 
security-development nexus, and there are different discursive positions within the nexus 
map, it could account for the outcomes of the policy being different from the each other. 
In turn this might explain why the policy is in need of constant evaluation.
The mapping is done, by drawing on established familiar accounts of different academic 
discourses and concepts articulated within “the nexus”, such as related to “security” and 
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“development”5 i.e. those from the aforementioned rim of the nexus, and looking into the 
trajectories and legacies of these. This mapping becomes a selection of different nexuses 
or domains within the collective nexus, which of cause in light of the very nature of 
discourses cannot embrace nor account for every and all meanings within the collective 
security-development nexus6. But it brings two interesting outcomes available for further 
study.  The first  is  a  tool  to  find yet  new meanings  within the  nexus by tracking or 
counter-tracking trajectories of academic traditions to and fro a security-development 
nexus. It also provides an opportunity to either look into one reality of the nexus and 
ease interpretation (as to where the inherent logics derives from), or criticise means and 
measures of a security-development nexus outcome7.
This thesis does not concern itself with the former,  since it falls outside its  limits to 
question the security-development nexus as a proven concept, by tracking, categorising, 
or defining the independent areas and sub-fields within academia. Rather the thesis looks 
into the correlation between already established academic concepts or discourses, of the 
nexus with those formulated by public perception and policy makers. Thus, using the 
approach available in the latter tool of Stern and Öjendal's mapping.
From the understanding that there are different approaches to nexus, depending on the 
discursive disposition in the nexus map, and given the large interplay between the levels 
of policy-making, academia and public perception, it can address functionality and of the 
DCA without seeking to engage corrective measures of the policy.8  
5 ”... which derives both from the policy world and from the realm of academic debate, as well as their 
inevitable interminglings” Stern & Öjendal 2010 (the interminglings refers to an earlier 
acknowledgement that the levels of acdemia and political reality are interdependent and the move from 
one into the other (and vice versa) is shortranged.) This interminglings are also addressed by Buur, 
Jensen & Stepputat (2007) who argue that the line between policy ideology and academic analysis are 
blurry
6 Simon Reid-Henry 2011 argues, somewhat not satisfied with Stern & Öjendal's limitation of not 
covering all possibilities in that the map Stern and Öjendal makes are too focused on the premise, that 
too readily accept policies which tries in incorporate both. “In short, while the approach to mapping 
they propose allows us to see why the nexus matters, and for whom, it does not so readily allow us to 
ask quite how it is made to matter, or whether, indeed, it even should.” (Reid-Henry 2011: 98)
7 ”Importantly, it becomes overly clear – though not empirically proven – that out map must contain 
many more than these six accounts of 'the nexus': the seemingly incompatible stories of various 
ontologically and epistemologically different accounts of development/security in this 'nexu' are 
rediculously plantiful, even infinite. In inviting the reader to probe the myriad meanings of 'the nexus' 
already discursively avalible, we fundamentally challenge the seeming consensus view of the nexus as 
imminent promise: Something given, cear and shared.” (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 9-10)
8 There are plenty of studies engage in fixing the DCA (and other such policies). See Stapleton 2003; 
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My concern in terms of the DCA as part of the security-development nexus, is how the 
policy  should  be  able  to  work,  when  the  constructivist  natures  of  the  nexus  lacks 
consensus. And since the DCA has trouble preforming it could be this lack of consensus 
which  is  causing  its  shortcomings.  However  it  is  difficult  to  pinpoint  where  the 
shortcomings are greatest, while this is contested as well. Some argue that there is a lack 
of  discursive  homogeneity between the Danish military and the  Ministry of  Foreign 
Affairs  (Stepputat 2012; Bittmann & Schaar 2012), while other points to lack of the 
states ability in micromanagement of the NGOs (Veicherts 2005). Others argue that there 
is an insufficient consensus on the operational level in the field (Petersen 2012), whilst 
yet others argue for a restructuring of the interministerial departments to accommodate 
the width of the nexus (Fitz-Gerald 2004; Stepputat 2009; 2012). Where the security-
development nexus encompasses so many different approaches, the DCA also span many 
different actors, both domestically and internationally. Through politicians, ministries, 
departments, civil servants, soldiers, NGOs, expatriates, contractors and so on. What I 
will engage with is the hypothesis that the difference in understanding of what the DCA 
is or should be, is the a central point in the disappointment of the DCA performance.
By  using  the  academic  discourses  which  Stern  and  Öjendal  provide  through  their 
mapping approach to the nexus, it enables an understanding of the inherent logic in the 
Danish policy, and allows for pinpointing, if possible, which discourse(s) of the nexus 
map,  the  policy  adheres  to.  (And  subsequently  whether  this  political  discourse  is 
consistent  through  the  policy  development  from 2005  to  2012  (less  important)).  In 
addition will the same proceedings be done to the discourse formulated by privileged 
actors  through  the  public  debate  surrounding  the  DCA.  This  concord,  or  difference 
between the policy discourse and the public perception and expectation discourse will 
add knowledge to how the DCA preforms.
That everybody knows what the security-development nexus is all  about,  yet no one 
seem to have the same collective understanding when it comes down to it, describes the 
predicament  which  seems  to  be  surrounding  the  DCA.  The  suspicion  in  is  that  the 
Fitz-Gerald 2004; Veicherts 2005; Alexa 2007; Stepputat 2009; Hovgaard 2011; Gordon 2011.
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discourses used in the two empirical blocks  (policy and public  discourse) can all  be 
related to  one or  more academic discourses  from Stern and Öjendal's  map,  but  it  is 
unlikely that they will be consistent, and might contribute to the explanation of why the 
DCA does not work as intended, why it is under constant critique, and why there has 
been a need for several revisions.
3.1 Research Question
Using discursive approaches,  how is  the security-development nexus discourse being 
employed in policy statements related to the Danish Comprehensive Approach as well as 
articulated by privileged actors in the Danish public debate?
3.1.1 Reader's guide / Project Design  
To try and answer the research question from I have used Jennifer Milliken's discursive 
approach to international relations (1999), which offers an insight into how the field of 
international relations can be viewed, whilst offering tools to analyse it. This is done 
from the preceding assumption, that due to the outspoken acclaim, yet constant debate 
and  call  for  re-evaluation  of  the  DCA in  the  public  sphere,  can  be  coupled  to  a 
dissonance between the discourse of in the DCA, which can be dissected through the 
mapping of the security-development nexus. After handling Milliken discourse approach 
I  present  the  thorough  explanation  of  Maria  Stern  and  Joakim  Öjendal's  security-
development nexus map. These are followed by the methodology chapter, in which I 
utilise the theories and present the empirical material.
4 Theory
4.1 Milliken's constructivist approach to International Relations
11
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Jennifer Milliken seeks to tidy up the use of discursive research by recognising certain 
commitments  made  in  international  relations  studies  using  discourse  theoretical 
approaches.  And among these approaches she recognises three bundles of theoretical 
claims  as  covering  the  essentials  of  the  field.  These  bundles  are  “systems  of 
significations”,  “discourse  productivity”,  and  “the  play  of  practice”  (Milliken  1999: 
228). 
The  “system of  signification” uses  the  constructivist  understanding that  the  material 
world does not convey meaning in itself, instead the meaning of things is a construction 
of a complex system of people using sign systems, “predominantly but not exclusively  
linguistic.” (Milliken  1999:  229)  This  approach  emphasize  two  thoroughfares  in 
understanding how people place meaning into constructs. In the first she draws on de 
Saussure  work  from  1974  (“Course  in  General  Linguistics”)  and  the  relationship 
between objects and their placement in the system, and the use of signs to recognise,  
locate  and  (re)place  these  (Milliken  1999:  229).  The  other  approach  to  systems  of 
significations  draws  on  Derrida  (1981)  and  the  understanding  of  structures  and 
constructed  binary  oppositions  or  positioning,  e.g.  the  emergent  significance  of 
Western/third world, modern/traditional, or educated/ignorant. The importance being that 
one of the binary component represent a relative proportionate power. The international 
community and international politics can be regarded as a system of signification, in 
which the (not predominantly) linguistic use can be shaping the construct in which the 
individual agents act accordingly.
The second bundle is  occupied by discourse productivity and how the constructs  of 
society are being produced. As well are the coloration between a discourse ability to 
produce and reproduce things  which in  itself  are  defined by the discourse.  Thus the 
discourse is created and creates a self-reinforcing system or structure (Milliken 1999: 
229). This trait in discourses can be explored in academic and political discourses as a 
self-fulfilling  prophecy,  which  becomes  interesting  when  trying  to  uncover  matters 
taken-for-granted. The discourse productivity is in IR linked to “subjects authorized to 
speak and to act”. These subjects shape the reality of the discourse through intentional 
practices. These “knowledgeable practices by these subjects towards the objects which 
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the  discourse  defines,  rendering  logical  and  proper  interventions  of  different  kinds, 
disciplining techniques and practices, and other modes of implementing a discursively 
constructed analysis.” (Milliken 1999: 229).
The knowledgeable practices in structuring systems are essential to Gidden's theory of 
structuration, in which it represents a knowledge about the system through which the 
agent  is  navigating.  The  agent  does  not  question  the  integrity  of  that  which  is 
knowledgeable practice, but uses it as a steady guide in the ever changing construction of 
society (Kaspersen 2001: 57). Milliken uses the knowledgeable practices to mean, that a 
reproduction of a function, defines the function of what it is; be it a soldier, a diplomat,  
or  a  development  worker.  It  also  means,  that  each  function  and  rationale  follows  a 
certain  logic  associated  with  this  particular  function  and  its  preceding  reproduces 
practices.
The third theoretical commitment is the “play of practice”, which studies the interplay of 
“...dominating or hegemonic discourses and their structuring of meaning as connected  
to  implementing  practices  and  ways  of  making  these  intelligible  and  legitimate” 
(Milliken 1999: 228). This commitment acknowledges that the interplay of discourses 
exists as an unstable mesh of  discourses constantly being formulated and reformulated, 
produced  and  reproduced,  to  fix  a  regime  of  truth  to  the  beholder.  Like  bubbles 
constantly being created, growing and busting in a large but confined space. Roxanne 
Doty argues that there is a danger of this mesh becoming uncontrollable and essential 
impossible  to  study,  because;  “Any  fixing  of  a  discourse  and the  identities  that  are  
constructed by it can only be of a partial nature. It is the overflowing and incomplete  
nature  of  discourses  that  opens  up  spaces  for  change,  discontinuity  and variation.” 
(Doty 1996: 6)  Milliken agues that this may hinder  “efforts made to stabilize and fix  
dominant meaning, as well as 'subjugated knowledge'”. However, the fear of a constant 
moving playing field,  as  a  constant  threat  within  the  constructivist  sciences,  can  be 
circumvented with a rubber band mentality applied to the discourse concepts. Such that 
the ability of development within a discourse is available, but it remains at least partly 
fixed (like a nail in a board) to a social and/or physical position in time and space. This 
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allows  for  categorisation  and  subsequent  study  of  this  constant  field  of  movement, 
construction and reproduction. Though Doty's recognition speaks against both the use of 
a mapping, like the one Stern and Öjendal brings, in any constructivist study. However, 
the acknowledgement that this may be the case, deprive anyone from attempting to talk 
the same language when doing research. So a constant knowledge that the structures of 
society are constantly moving, just counter for this.
Milliken argues for the use of four methods to address the play of practice on discourses 
production in relations to IR; the deconstructive method, the juxtaposition method, the 
method regarding subjugated knowledge, and the genealogical method. Each with their 
own ability to  be applied to  the empirical  world in  order  to  decipher  complexity of 
enabled discourses.
Milliken  argues  that  the  predominate  explanations  of  discourse  production;  “...have 
largely  been  explanations  of  how a  dominating  discourse  of  International  Relations  
produces the social reality that it defines.” This circular relationship is quite important to 
keep in mind, which is; that the system through discourses produces the reality which 
reproduce the system. But; “discourses require effort on the part of authorized speakers  
in order to produce and reproduce them, and such effort are not always successful.” 
(Milliken 1999: 242) This is important because some discourses can inhabit some of the 
same denominators or realities over time. And a singular discourse can exist on different 
planes of the given reality system which creates a historical contingent. This singular 
discourse can change from creating one reality in one historical time frame, and either 
develop new traits or loose momentum to another competing discourse.
The deconstruction method is used in textual analysis to find poles of opposition within 
texts. Of the poles of opposition the discourse will favour one over the other, or privilege 
one  over  the  other,  which  creates  the  realities  for  a  subsequent  production  and 
reproduction  of  new  truths.  This  can  be  used  in  analysis  to  shreds  doubt  on  any 
“orthodox meaning”  of  a  discourse.  And that  any orthodox  meaning  is  not  a  stable 
foundation but merely constructed, thus giving way for other interpretations. E.g. The 
14
Master Thesis Lars Hededam – 2014
policy want  to  “stabilise  states”  or  “create  a  platform for  development”  in  order  to 
“secure the national borders”. The oppositions being “their development”/”our security”, 
(and the latter being the privileged through textual analysis) (Duffield 2001: 16). The 
analysis can then take the basis, platform, or origin of reality, and reverse or displace 
them to create new realities. Thus rising the analytical pondering; “so if you didn't mean 
to focus on development but instead primarily security, what are you actually doing to 
secure?” or “ if you didn't mean to focus on security but instead primarily development, 
what are you actually doing to developing this state?”
The juxtaposition method instigates the possibility of an incoherence between  certain 
elements  or  actions  within  the  discourse  parameters,  and  the  subsequent  reproduced 
truths. Theses truths might not account for, acknowledge or address the issue in question. 
The excise here, is to find the incoherency between “the discourse” and “the reality”, i.e. 
“the discourse” of a policy could be incoherent with “the reality” with its practitioners, 
or a political discourse which seeks to address a problem that with a closer scrutinizing 
reveals a misunderstanding of the problem, a pseudo-problem or a non-existing problem. 
“The point of this method is not to establish the “right story” but to render ambiguous  
predominant interpretations of state practices and to demonstrate the inherently political  
nature of official discourses.” (Milliken 1999: 243) This method is especially good at 
looking into policies under suspicions of being out of sync with reality, however the 
policy drives  the  understanding  of  “the  truth”  of  a  given  situation.  In  that  way the 
premise for the thesis, through the hypothesis, is a matter of a juxtaposition approach 
where it  is expected that there is incoherency between the public perception and the 
discourse of the policy papers. However still recognising that both discourses are truth in 
their own reality.
Using subjugated  knowledge method extends  from the  juxtaposition  one,  but  differs 
where instead of pointing to the presence of alternative truths or discourses, in which the 
research  investigate  the  alternative  discourse  itself  for  being  in  opposition  to  the 
dominating  discourse  found  in  the  empirical  research.  Seeking  out  the  subjugated 
knowledge in discourses allows for an understanding of the relationship between the 
dominating  or  hegemonic  discourse  and  a  subjugated  discourse  which  creates  the 
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foundation (of knowledge) for the discourse itself, “...showing that they are enabled by a 
discourse  that  does  not  overlap  substantially  with  a  dominating  discourse” (own 
emphasis;  Milliken  1999:243).  Examples  of  this  could  be  either  the  discourses  and 
inherent truth that precede the current dominating discourse and render this possible to 
exist. E.g. before the Enlightenment policies were based on the subjugated knowledge of 
religiosity, which created both the knowledge foundation for a policy discourse, but also 
constitute the background of concepts and thus the significant space of objects.
The genealogical study method focuses unlike the deconstructive method, on discourses 
as  a  “survival  of  the  fittest”.  The  genealogical  method  does  not  regard  historical 
development as a progression of leading to the present, but instead sees; “... a series of  
discursive  formations  that  are  discontinuous,  break  with  one  another  in  terms  of  
discursive objects, relations, and their operationalization” (Milliken 1999: 243). This 
triggers the importance of dominance among discourses and relations of power becomes 
an important point of study. These insures in the discourse that  “unity with the past is  
artificially  conserved  and  order  is  created  from  conditions  of  disorder.” The 
genealogical method allows an understanding of the discourse as a sense of linage to past 
discourses, and seeks to understand how the liquidity within the discourse are organised 
through  power  play.  Where  the  genealogical  study  method  are  interesting,  it  does 
concentrate on the discontinuity of discourses, suggesting that two such as the public 
perception and policy paper discourse, might be able to exist at the same time, but not on 
the same plane of existence. And since there is basis in the problem field and hypothesis 
to study hegemonic positioning, the genealogical study method falls out of favour.
4.2 Stern & Öjendal's discourse map of the security-development nexus
As  presented  in  the  problem  field  Stern  and  Öjendal  (2010)  argues  for  a  better 
categorisation  and  orientation  through  the  different  approaches  to  the  security-
development nexus. The mapping they suggest, presents a range of different discourses, 
which are used with regard to the security-development nexus. The different academic 
discourses must be understood as existing simultaneously in (inhabiting) the same field 
of existence, without any exclaimed power relation, and are only prone to ascend once 
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formulated  within  the  working  discourses  of  the  empirical  knowledge,  as  they  are 
produced and reproduced in the public  debate,  the policy papers,  or  the  programme 
documents.
The art of defining what the nexus contains, how it should be understood, and why it 
matters, is task worth undertaking. As they argue; “Surely the power of definition over  
“development” and “security” also implies power to define not only the relevant field of  
interest,  but also the material content of practices, the distribution of resources, and  
subsequent policy responses” (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 7). This sentiment is somewhat an 
echo  from  the  constructivist  and  discursive  approach  to  international  relations  that 
Milliken presents, and resonates in David Chandler's article “The Security-Development  
Nexus and the Rise of 'Anti-Foreign' Policy” (2007).
The argument suggests that the definition of what lies within the concept of the security-
development nexus also defines the possible outcomes of both actions, consequences, 
and causal connections. E.g. If the discourse of the nexus implies huge risks to national 
security from a foreign non-state actor, due to underdevelopment in the range of the 
aggressor, subsequently due to state fragility, the action towards the state, following this 
discourse, can be correction by stabilising the central state. The causal connection in this 
example is between underdevelopment and non-state aggression. Then both the outline 
of the problem, the solution and the keynotes and actors are implicit already chosen to a 
certain degree.
Stern and Öjendal argues that the realm of policy has made a plea for more attention to  
the nexus, due to  “confusion, lack of conceptual clarity and ideological divisions, at  
best, and rhetorical façades, interest politics and shallow political correctness, at worst  
…. Academic discourse have not adequately addressed the 'nexus'” (Stern & Öjendal 
2010: 7) They create a mapping of the nexus by illustrating the discourses most common 
used when addressing issues related to the nexus, as they “draw upon familiar account  
of different understandings of 'development' and 'security', which derive both from the  
policy  world  and  from  the  realm  of  academic  debate,  as  well  as  their  inevitable  
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interminglings” (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 7)
These  understandings  presented  in  the  map  constitutes  the  six  discourses  of 
“development” and “security”, and their interminglings. The discourse map argued by 
Stern and Öjendal comes in pairs of security and development, and the first one handles 
the  difficulty  of  framing  security  and  development,  as  a  spatio-temporal-bridge  of 
relative time and space. A teleological narrative are being applied, and thus the deep 
historical roots of both concepts are implied.  “Traditional 'security' and 'development'  
have  been  imbued  with  meaning  through  linear  modernist  discourses  that  reflect  
European experience and resonate with colonial logics” (Hettne 2010: 39). The map can 
theoretically be across all categories, creating new nexuses in the process.
4.2.1 Teleological  
This modern teleological narratives is concerned with, in terms of development, what 
one (agent, structure, or state) is supposed to be. As a result following the decolonisation 
development were concerned with state-building as a remedy for economic growth and 
political consolidation. The deficiency of the state, insofar as what it was supposed to be, 
was underdevelopment which is fuelled by a modernisation belief. In this discourse the 
state is seen as the key actor and guarantor for development, which related to economic 
terms. The hope was to deliver the underdeveloped state as a well defined nation-state, 
through a linear “biological” development path similar to the historical development of 
Europe, but sped up (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 11). 
Similarly the teleological narratives of security are based on; ”The dominant and oft-told  
story  of  the  state,  the  international  system  of  states  and  survival  is  a  story  about  
emergence: becoming (secure) and fulfilling the promise of achieved security.” (Stern & 
Öjendal 2010: 14) This narrative follows a temporal trajectory of insecurity now or in 
the past, which should give way for security in the present or near future, and ultimate 
security and “all  that it  implies” in the future.  This view on security achievement is 
closely linked to “the principles of modern state sovereignty” (and the difficult definition 
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of sovereignty (Krasner 1999)) (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 14). Which, like the trajectory 
expected  of  teleological  development,  follows  the  emergence  of  state  security  as 
formulated through the history and formation of Europe9 (Stern & Öjendal 2010). The 
sovereign state is the central actor in the international system, thus the security of the 
state becomes essential.  The logic is, that if the state is not secure, the citizens (and 
everything  else  connected  hereto)   becomes  imperilled.  Even  though  reference  and 
picture of security and indeed insecurity have changed within the last couple of decades, 
the survival and security of the state is  still  predominantly the first  concern and last 
stronghold, of politics in and towards states. Dillon (1996) argues that this promise of 
security is a continues strive toward an utopic amount of security. Complete security can 
be an aspiration, but can ultimately never be achieved. “(Inevitable) danger and threat  
require  the  continual  enactment  of  security  measures10 that  will  (ultimately)  end 
insecurity  and  enable  the  ‘good  society’ to  flourish  and  develop”  argues  Stern  and 
Öjendal (2010: 14) to how security works in the teleological state narrative.
When looking at the combined narrative, Stern and Öjendal argues that the teleological 
discourse is around the concepts of state and state sovereignty, both in terms of security, 
but also development. And with this understanding, also the expectation of a trajectory in 
behaviour  similar  to  a  concerted  European  history  (Stern  &  Öjendal  2010).  These 
expectations were largely seen as fallible in the wake of the Cold War,  however the 
notion of the sovereign state security and economic development are still being applied 
(Engberg-Pedersen 2008a)11. 
This combined teleological narrative discourse (as a nexus) rely on a mutuality between 
the  emergence  of  security  and  development.  The  argument  goes;  “...the  promise  of  
security  depends  upon  a  successful  (and  sure-footed)  march  towards  progress  and  
modernity and the forms of modern life that inhere in this trajectory, and vice versa  
9 Would you like to know more? See Appendix 1 for a short overview of the emergence of European 
states
10 ”As this story is contingent upon danger and threat always looming, its main plot is also dependent on 
a subplot that relies on a repetitive or even cyclical temporality: new threats keep emerging” 
(Hutchings 2008: 14)
11 This is also a central point in the discussion concerning the conceptualisation and framing of the 
”fragile state” concept. A concept which relies heavily on this teleological narrative of what a state is 
supposed to be, in order to be regarded as sufficient secure and developed. For more see; Andersen  
2007; Chatterjee 1998; Call 2008
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...When  spatially  located  within  the  same  place  (state),  ‘the  nexus’ emerges  as  the  
juncture through which the conditions of and for security mutually reinforce those for  
development and progress: internal confluence.” (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 17).
It rings true when both aspects are in abundance. High level of development is being 
held in place by sophisticated high level of security, and vice versa. By inductive logic 
this shows a double-bind where security and development are mutually reinforced, and 
thus this logic should be true in all levels and stages of development and security. Stern 
&  Öjendal  note  that  this  mutuality  crumbles  in  contexts  where  neither  security  or 
development is attained. So in places where the preconditions and logics of this nexus 
are not  met,  the application of “the nexus” becomes dysfunctional (Stern & Öjendal 
2010: 18).
The nexus also refers to both a spacing in distance or geography and a spacing in relative 
time – the temporal denominator. “E.g developing countries are 'lagging behind' those  
more  'developed'” (Stern  &  Öjendal  2010:  18)12.  Also;  the  continual  security  and 
prosperity (development) of one state are dependent on security and development, or 
susceptible to insecurity and underdevelopment of another state.  Underlining that the 
condition of “the state” is based on this conceptual linage of European state formation 
and maintenance.  “Emphasis is placed on the bridge occurring between (our future)  
security  (as  paramount  and  located  in  one  place  –  the  North)  and  development  
(over/down/back there/then)” (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 18) . This spatio-  temporal-bridge   
includes both the nexus discourse as a question of security and development regarding 
the creation, maintenance, or fragility of “the teleological state”, and also the nexus as a 
question of sustaining “the teleological state” as a specific and important part  of the 
international system.
12 The understanding in relation to time is that of relative security, and relative development. As widely 
understood the neoliberal order is based on the evolutionary development of European prosperity and 
understanding of security. The temporal understanding feeds into the history of this evolutionary 
development, and classifies state accordingly. E.g. in development terms the human rights within (and) 
the justice system in Iran are medieval, drawing reference to a time in European   history where justice 
system where similar, thus creating a relative datum point. This datum point are then measured, 
somewhat arbitrarily, against the same reference system, i.e. European justice system and human 
rights, as it appears today. Between these two points are build a linear progression, in which the 
development are expected to progress along. Stern & Öjendal: "Emphasis is placed on the brigde 
occurring between (our future) security (as paramount and located on in one place – the North) and 
development (over/down/back there/then)."
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4.2.2 Broadening and humanising  
The second discourse on Stern and Öjendal's  map is the broadening, deepening, and 
humanisation  of  security  and  development  (henceforth  humanisation/human).  This 
discourse  explores  the  deficiency  of  development,  and  security  respectively,  of  the 
teleological  state.  The  discourse  towards  development  is  grounded  in  a  divided 
argument,  which  on  one  side  contains  a  Marxist/structuralists  critique  that  the 
development  somewhat  forces  the  self-sufficiency  away  from  the  “Third  World” 
(Wallerstein 1974), by the structurally exploitative nature of the capitalist world system 
(Stern  & Öjendal  2010:  11).  The  argument  resonates  well  with  Mark Duffield  who 
argues;  “Contrary  to  popular  views  of  globalisation  which  often  portray  capitalist  
relations as redoubling their penetration and interconnection of all parts of the globe,  
the core regions of what could now be termed the liberal world system appear to be  
consolidating and strengthening the ties between them at the expense of outlying areas” 
(Duffield 2001: 3). Though this capitalist deficiency allowed for considerations to “de-
link” the development world, the teleological discourse of development as state-centric 
and elite-driven were still in place.
The other side of the argument is that of human development, which instead of focussing 
on the economic development, or even the structural (Marxist) development, of the state, 
the human development discourse are concerned with developments ability to reconnect 
to the true subjects of development;  “...namely,  namely, the poor, the local, the grass  
roots and the voiceless” (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 12). This discourse included the notion 
of  ”putting  the  last  first”  reframing  the  focus  to  the  weak  and  the  poor.  ”Small  is 
beautiful” as a development technique moving the focus from the central state to small 
initiatives. And finally the use of ”appropriate technology” marked an understanding that 
there might not be a necessity to override the ideological goals of development, but by 
looking  inwards  and  backwards  and  mending  the  wrongs,  the  goals  were  still 
achievables13.
13 For more, see; Chambers 1983 or Schumacher 1973
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The human security narrative offers a broadening and widening of the security concept,  
which  goes  beyond the  teleological  state  to  include  a  range of  different  threats  and 
insecurite  referent  objects.  New objects  of  security included the range from terrorist 
networks,  gender-based violence,  violent  ‘ethnic’ discrimination,  to global pandemics 
and climate change (Beck 2006)14. Human security addresses issues which constitutes 
the  pursuit  of  freedom  from  threats  towards  the  individual  (Buzan  et  al.  1998). 
“...human security offers its advocates a language for addressing different experiences  
of (in)security” (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 15). This insecurity include both physical threats 
like hunger, violence and even unemployment, as well as psychosocial threats including 
social marginalisation, loss of identity, culture etc. (Øberg 1983: 174)
As  well  as  these  threats  towards  security which  differ  from teleological  nation-state 
based  security,  this  narrative  also  includes  security  messeaure  beyond  the  sovereign 
state. Such as the privitisation and commodification of security15 (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 
15).
The combined narrative of human security and development, addresses the challenges of 
”what the foundation for good, safe and just society might be.” (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 
18)  The  nexus  might  look  back  into  what  Stern  &  Öjendal  frames  as  a  “cyclical 
temporality” to find a stage of genuine desirable living, security and safety, for both the 
biosphere, the human condition and the cultural diversity. The nexus might also look into 
a forward trajectory from the neoliberal security and development, e.g. “one that attends  
to the localized experiences (fear, desires, needs, etc.) of vulnerable peoples” (Stern & 
Öjendal  2010:  18;  Duffield  2010).  They  suggest  that  the  re-conceived  security-
development  nexus  (human narrative)  is  too  aberrant  from the  “mainstream idea of  
determinism in what one is suppose to become” (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 18), i.e. the 
dominant discourse is the neoliberal one, whether or not it might be the best suited to 
deal with the problems on the nexus.  “In this logic, 'the nexus'  can perhaps be best  
illustrated as the merging of human development and human security – as intricate and  
complex ambitions in idealist  and normative combinations.”  (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 
14 The liquid modernity of Zygmunt Bauman (2000) , and Ulrich Beck's ”Risk Society” (1996) address 
this challenges of (in)security.
15 For more, see: Chatterjee 1998; Folke Frederiksen 2010
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19).
4.2.3 Development at an impasse and the impossible security  
Follows a  resignation  after  several  failures  in  the  field  of  development.  A historical 
consideration was made in the 80's, and it became clear that the structural development, 
and the structural adjustment programmes did not arrive anywhere near the desired goal 
of  development16.  The  argument  from the critiques  were;  “...development  have been 
tried and did not work; furthermore, 'it' was ineffective and possibly harmful”  (Stern & 
Öjendal 2010: 12) Due to the visible raise in poverty, the critique of development as a 
post-colonial instrument to keep the image of the “Third World” as homogeneous, and 
the  further  comfort  grip  of  the  state  as  “the  agent  and referent  in  the  development  
process, in the wake of emerging globalization”17 (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 12).
The narrative on security as impossible Campbell (1998) and Dillon (1996), who argue 
that “security measures increase fear and a sense of impending danger: the prescribed  
order,  stability  or  “fortress”  is  inherently  precarious  and  in  need  of  reinforcing” 
(Campbell 1998). Some of this critique of security arguably coincide with the argument, 
that security measures designed to secure the state, end up causing harm to humans and 
society. Predator states, where the central state is very secure and quite strong, but the 
people  suffers  under  an  authoritarian  elite  or  leadership,  have  all  too  often  been  a 
tangible example of the paradox of security for some, and not for all. The concern for the 
impossible creation of security,  is also the risk that security efforts creates ripples of 
violence and fear, and produce more insecurity, both within and beyond the target area18. 
(Stern & Öjendal 2010)
The nexus between development as an impasse and security as impossible to achieve, 
can  achieve  nothing  but  failure.  Stern  &  Öjendal  argues;  “According  to  the  
‘impasse/impossible’ account, as currently articulated and implemented, ‘the nexus’ is  
empty, impossible, harmful; the policies enacted in its name achieve little, if anything,  
16 The Danish engangement in Tanzania, building huge concrete factories ineffectively undermined the 
workforce and economic development. (Nielson 1999) And the dire consequences from the Live Aid 
projects (Dercon 2012), were the examples from this narrative of development at an impasse.
17 For more see Schuurman 1993; 2000
18 For more see; Ackerly, Stern & True (2006)
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desirable, but instead cause harm and occasion the wasting of time and money."  (Stern 
& Öjendal 2010: 19) This approach to the nexus expresses that measures, on whatever 
normative background, are achieving nothing but failure. Development efforts result in 
underdevelopment,  more  poverty and disenfranchisement,  and security efforts  breeds 
“insecurity,  violence  and  threat  in,  for  instance,  the  theatre  of  new wars”  (Stern  & 
Öjendal  2010:  19).  The  failure  of  these  efforts  can  be  found  above  in  the 
impasse/impossible  boxes,  but  mount  to  matters  and  cases  of  “lessons  learned” 
essentially.  White elephants, dependency traps, distortion of local and regional power 
balance, and so on.
The balance of failed efforts are between efforts not having the desired effect, to outright  
disaster, making the preceding situation worse. A step back from status quo so to speak. 
People were poor, now they are dead. However it should be worth pointing out, that the 
nexus is at an impasse or impossible to realise, not because the matters of security and 
development  fail  once  they  are  put  together,  according  to  this  approach.  Both 
development and security efforts fail on their own accord, and bringing them together 
does not lessen this downfall. And it can not mend the situation, hence two wrongs do 
not make a right.
4.2.4 Post-development and security.  
The post-development narrative is a critical reaction towards development, arguing that 
development  as  a  discourse  kept  an  imperialistic  grip  on  the  underdeveloped,  and 
reproduced colonial  power relations  and attitudes  (Stern & Öjendal  2010:  12).   The 
critique claimed that the “development” in any shape or form (yet created) were the 
source of the problem not the solution.
The  Post-development  critique  (school)  claimed  that  from-within  progress  in 
development  issue  were  practically  impossible,  and  it;  “disempowered  people,  and  
disrupted existing local power structures, thus creating instability and conflict” (own 
underlining, Stern & Öjendal 2010: 12).
The post-security narrative departs from the perpetual fortress-building concept from the 
impossible security narrative above, and argues that security as a goal can not be reach, 
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but  a  securitisation  of  a  certain  issue  or  subject  matter,  creates  a  constant  perpetual 
aspiration. (Buzan,Wæver & de Wilde 1998; Wæver 1995). Critical scholars, like the 
Copenhagen school (Wæver), argue that the subject matters which are being somewhat 
secured, becomes a constant products and object of securitisation. The political powers 
of security become a constant,  “perpetual  production of  danger and fear” (Stern & 
Öjendal 2010: 16) .
The nexus of post-development and post-security produce certain (new) realities through 
discourse engagement, thus creating new tools, and the nexus itself becomes a new tool 
of power.  Because they hail  from the same breeding ground, i.e.  pre-to-post-colonial 
Europe, with its grounded logic of neoliberal and sovereignty, the nexus favours certain 
subjectivities.  "Practices and discourses of security–development ... reproduce spatio-
temporally defined relations of inequality, injustice, harmful mechanisms of inclusion  
and exclusion, violence, insecurity and danger. According to this account, security and  
development are both (im)possible and inherently oxymoronic in themselves, as well as  
in  combination  (i.e.  in  ‘the  nexus’).  They  become self-  perpetuating  and impossible  
promises, as well as vectors for those with vested interests to protect." (Stern & Öjendal 
2010: 18). Stern and Öjendal argues that this type of nexus should be avoided and feared, 
which due to its ability to create the foundation for failed- or underdevelopment, and 
subsequently through securitisation create a perpetual security issue.
4.2.5 The techniques of governmentality  
The techniques of governmentality tackle development and security as a technique to 
determine and enforce how life is supposed to be lived, and who should be able to live 
this life. The development side marks a shift away from the neoliberal trend (Hettne 
2010;  Duffield  2007)  to  “a  call  for  stronger  institutions  and  more  responsible  
regulation” (Stern  & Öjendal  2010:  13).  This  call  includes  an  enhanced  awareness 
towards previous failures and negative unintentional consequences in the development 
sector. This shift is especially evident, with the re(new)ed focus on fragile and failing 
states. The critique of the development policy (roughly 1995-present day) argues it has 
become “a technique of governmentality of disciplinary and biopolitical control” (Stern 
& Öjendal 2010: 13). Duffield (2010) argues to the morality of development, that the 
focus should be understood “in terms of how life is to be supported and maintained, and  
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how people are expected to live,  rather than according to economic and state-based  
models” (Stern  &  Öjendal  2010:  13),  Stern  and  Öjendal  are  concerned  with  the 
technique  of  governmentality  narrative,  as  they  argue;  “...practices  of  development,  
ostensibly designed to ‘uplift’ first states, and later societies and peoples, are techniques  
of government (broadly understood) that separate lives worth living from those that are  
expendable,  dangerous,  or  insufficient  and  unacceptable  because  of  their  
incompleteness”  (Stern  &  Öjendal  2010:  16;  Buur  et  al  2007). The  danger  of  this 
governmentality is on which basis the morality is formulated, i.e. which standards dictate 
what  and how life  should be  lived.  What  are  the  accepted  standards  for  the  human 
condition? 2015 goals? Capitalist ascension? Or perhaps something entirely different.
The technique of governmentality on security matters;  “Security, in these readings, is  
seen as  a technique  of  sovereign  power  that  produces  certain  sorts  of  subjects  and  
involves  oppression,  regulation,  violence,  control,  policing  and  surveillance  of  life  
itself” (Stern & Öjendal 2010:16). There is an underlying understanding in this critique 
of security as being a technique of governmentality, that the neoliberal order becomes 
the outline  of  successful  security.  Any deviation from this  order  will  (or  should)  be 
corrected by the sovereign state. It uses the duality of security and liberty, that you can 
not have complete security as well as total liberty at the same time. This argument is said 
to have the same underlying violent grammar (huysmans 2004).
The focus of security as a governmentality entails an inherent logic of “them and us”.  
Insurance  of  security  becomes  a  matter  of  selective  (often  linked  to  nation-state) 
rendering of who is worthy of security, who are not, and who must can or must die in 
this order. Stern and Öjendal propose this as “certain forms of life” as subjects needing 
insurance.  This could be e.g. the American population in need of security promotion 
after 2001. In that phrase lies a key components of globalisation and liquidity, which in 
“forms of life”, are not limited to humans, but able to encircle more of biosphere if  
needed, in terms of governmentality.
The technique of governmentality as a nexus is all about how the components of security 
and  development  are  being  used  to  govern,  through  biopolitical  power  in  which 
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"subjectivity, imagination, and ultimately life are governed." (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 20). 
The narrative sees the nexus as a governmental tool, with its own ends, to govern the 
population.  Both domestically  and internationally,  in  development  efforts  or  security 
efforts;  "Such  readings  make  visible  and  trace  the  ways  in  which  techniques  of  
‘security/development’ counter  the  insurgency  against  sovereign  biopower  –  through  
controlling,  disciplining,  ‘uplifting’ and  regulating  the  ‘dangerous’,  the  unruly,  the  
subalterns  and  the  voiceless.  Understood  this  way,  the  discursive  use  and  concrete  
enactment of ‘the nexus’ (through both technologies and policies) seemingly evacuate  
the  political  question  of  the  ethics  of  ‘governing  the  other’,  and  life  itself,  and  
technologize (or in other words, depoliticize) the (bio)politics of security–development." 
(Stern & Öjendal 2010: 20)
4.2.6 Globalised development and security  
The  narrative  of  globalised  development  and  security,  is  a  critique  of  the  level  of 
operation for policies and initiatives. The narrative of globalised development argues that 
the  problems  are  not  limited  to  geographically  restricted  regions/areas/states,  and 
accordingly can the solutions not be applied locally only. A global approach, such as 
global governance must be sought. However, should approach might not be altogether 
detached  from  previous  paradigms  and  critique.  “The  global  (good)  governance 
discourse holds that (neoliberal) globalization works through processes such as trade,  
migration, aid flows and foreign direct investments, but, importantly, fails because of  
feeble attempts at regulating  these on a global scale” (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 13). The 
critique of this discourse is, that the attempt to govern these processes of development in 
the  end,  end up undermining the  authority,  sovereignty,  and autonomy of  the  states 
involved, and creating a risk of returning to a new form of colonialism, in a globalised 
framework (Hettne 2010; Stern & Öjendal 2010). Another line of critique argue that 
when development efforts changes focus from local perspectives to global perspectives, 
risk the change of exacerbating the vulnerabilities (such as poverty and gender-based 
violence)  of  those  most  at  risk,triggering  conflicts  and  even  imminent  planetary 
environmental catastrophe (Cerny 1999). 
The globalised  security  discourse  have  two main  narratives.  The first  utilising  “risk 
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management” from Ulrich Beck (2006), which entails security risks, or insecurities that 
transcends  the  single  state.  This  can  be  anything  from  global  environmental 
sustainability including cause and effect of global warming and natural disasters (Stern 
&  Öjendal  2010:  17).  Nuclear  proliferation,  organised  criminality,  terrorist  activity, 
systemic  economic  derailing,  and  piracy,  are  also  issues  which  enables  a  risk 
management on a global scale. The other narrative is that of universal human security. 
The drive to create a transnational humanitarianism which focuses on human security 
must  be dealt  with  in  a  global  perspective.  Thus the  insecurity  are  both  very local, 
concerning  down  to  single  individuals,  and  global  as  the  insecurity  are  not 
geographically  bound.  (Stern  &  Öjendal  2010:  16)  This  echoes  the  morality  driven 
approach, which also were present in the development as a technique of governmentality 
narrative, and contains some of the same troubling issues of definition. 
Considering  the  combination  of  these  narratives  can  force  a  reconsideration  of  the 
ontology of globalisation19, which can define or limit the both security and development 
as globalised phenomenons. However presented by Stern and Öjendal, it mainly focuses 
on a  definition of:  “One that  no longer relies  on 'methodological  territorialization'" 
(Stern & Öjendal 2010: 20). Which however, is a knowledge and continuation of, the 
morality of a neoliberal order. But here focusing on matters which only transcends state 
sovereign  borders.  "Uncertainty  and contingency,  along with  subjectivity,  belonging,  
accountability  and  responsibility,  are  globalized."  (Stern  &  Öjendal  2010:  20).  The 
nexus acts as a vector for representing the human condition and issues connected hereto, 
on a global scale.
5 Methodology
5.1 The immensity of the DCA
The DCA span immense possibility for analysis, and choosing to look specifically at the 
discourse difference between the public perception and expectation, and the discourse in 
19 For a more detailed account of reaches and limits of Globalisation, see David Held and Anthony 
McGrew (eds.) (2007 )
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the  written  policy,  narrows  the  focus  and  leave  many a  perspectives  untouched and 
unturned. 
5.1.1 Background interview  
To gain background knowledge to this thesis I conducted several interviews with civil 
servants  from the  ministries  and sub-departments.  Links  can  be  found in the  list  of 
references
5.2 Choice of theory
The thesis carries a discursive approach to the understanding of the field of the security-
development nexus as part of International Relations studies. The constructivist approach 
is  chosen  because  partly  because  notion  of  the  security-development  nexus  as 
encompassing  a  range of  different  approaches  into  the  same overall  framework,  yet 
featuring contradicting ideas, and vastly different ontologies, but at the same time being 
accepted and used so widely.
And partly because constructivism allows for an examination of the nexus as a collection 
of discourses. This make further sense on the basis of the argument that the realm of 
policy-makers and the realm of analysing academics are closely linked, academia being 
rapidly  applied  in  policy-making,  and  re-analysed  in  academia  quickly  after.  These 
interminglings are in structuralist sense not a problem, whilst the system are perceived to 
remain steady. As opposed to the effects the interminglings have from a constructivist 
perspective, creating a movement in and of the field of study, which again are in need of 
reinterpretation. Constructivism enables an analysis of this complexity, as a diversity of 
discourses, both political and academic.
5.2.1 The constructivist approach  
The thesis uses a constructivist approach to this study of the DCA. This choice have 
been made to accommodate the inconclusiveness of the field of the security-development 
nexus, which is always in motion. The constructivist approach encompass the fleeting 
nature of the security-development nexus, of which there exist little consensus, apart 
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from the  acceptance  that  it  exists  and that  it  matters20.  The  hypothesis  of  the  thesis 
suggests that there is a distortion between the characteristics of the policy discourse, and 
the  public  expectation  (by  privileged  actors)  of  what  the  DCA can  do.  The  use  of 
constructivism disregards any claims of the DCA as a policy which either works or fails 
in  an  object  reality.  Instead  it  allows  the  understanding  that  both  the  policy,  the 
perception and the reality, or social constructs, these engage in, which change according 
to point of view, history, geography and vested interests and powers plays.
Because the constructivist approach discard the notion of a difinitive truth in the field of 
research, and the use of discursive analysis, the product balances on the reflection and 
choices made. These reflections becomes the levers, which are used in the analysis. But 
the analysis  of discourses fail  in attempts of getting on discussion alone. Although a 
discursive analysis can not follow stringent methodology which be replicated as closely 
as possible, like the realists insistence on bean counting in International Relations, there 
must be a strive to create distinctions in the theories, so that the same elements are used 
indiscriminately throughout the analysis (Hansen 2004: 406).
5.2.2 Why use Stern & Öjendal's map?  
The use of Stern & Öjendal's map, and its discursive components was chosen because it 
embraces  the fluidity of the nexus as a constructivist system, but limiting the scope of 
analysis,  to  only  regard  a  handful  of  possible  security  and  development  discourses. 
Discourses not in the map can, as suggested by the two authors, be explored and added. 
And even though this possibility of exploring other discourses with unique features and 
compositions are acknowledge21, the pursuit of these lies beyond the grasp of the thesis.
By offering six (or twelve) accounts of development and security discourses, the map 
enables  levers  to  separate  the  composition  (discourses)  of  the  nexuses,  which  are 
constituted  within  the  different  parts  of  the  DCA (policy  and  public  debate).  The 
20 See Fitz-Gerald 2004; Hurwitz & Peake 2004; Chandler 2007; Stern & Öjendal 2010.
21 For instance could the genealogy of Feminist theory in International Relation be explore and mapped 
accordingly. For more, see Ackerly et al. (2006).
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discourse constituting the composition of the main nexus22, i.e. the DCA as policy, can 
then be determined in terms of discursive analysis, to create an elaborate “picture”. With 
this done, it enables a determination if (or how) the discourses of the DCA are being 
employed in the public debate, and applied in the subsequent programmes, or whether 
this  exceeds  the  confined  nexus  of  the  DCA policy  discourse  can  be  analysed  and 
discussed.
Whereas there are other academic accounts of the security-development nexus which 
offer both a discursive, detailed, and power related takes on the nexus and insights into 
the volatility, complexity, and strengths or weaknesses, these accounts often rely either 
on a complete containment of the field and nexus, in a search of truism, or offers a 
critical statement towards the applied effects of the nexus. Or offers avenues to repair 
pragmatic  flaws  in  the  operational  end  of  nexus  policies  (Veicherts  2005),  i.e.  a 
recognition that the nexus as a policy does not preform as expected, and how this short-
coming can be corrected (Stepputat 2012). These alternating accounts are not entirely 
discarded as improbable or unusable, but already inhabits some of the discourses of the 
nexus map, and offers additional explanations and insights in these defined (by Stern & 
Öjendal, accepted by me) discourse.
There is a limitation in using the offered mapping of the nexus, which only can make an 
approximation of the DCA to the map of the nexus. The alternative would be to locate 
the DCA in a unique position within the nexus. While that would allow for a specific 
understanding of the unique position of the DCA within the nexus, it would sacrifices the 
generality which a systematic modelling (which the map is). It would arguably also limit 
the possibility of relating differences between the different discourses in the empirical 
finding. Without the relatable backdrop of the mapping, comparison would be a futile as 
weighing water under water.
22 ”The main nexus” is the perception as the DCA policy as a representation of the security-development 
nexus, in that specific shape. This nexus constitutes the basis, or baseline, for the comparison of 
possible differentiations. 
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5.2.3 Application of Stern & Öjendal's map?  
The map will used as a theoretical foundation, on which the empirical reality of the DCA 
policy and subsequent public perception and political implementation, can be analysed. 
Through Milliken's approach to discourse analysis (tackled below), the DCA will be put 
under  scrutiny,  to  realise  which  parts  of  the  field  of  study,  which  is  the  security-
development nexus in its  entirety,  the policy inhabits.  Based on the six narratives of 
development (as part of the nexus) and the six narratives of security, the map will offer 
an insight into which parts of the nexus, the DCA adheres to or inhabits.
Since the DCA is product of the security-development nexus, the use of the map creates 
an opportunity the review different discourses, and see which part of the nexus narratives 
(map) they inhabit. It also enables a possibility, in accordance with the hypothesis, to see 
how they differ from each other, in terms of the mapped categories. In the case of this 
thesis does the DCA policy documents represent a discourse, which is presumed to be 
pieced together from parts of the mapped nexus. This assumption is a clear choice, to 
perceive  the  DCA  as  consisting  of  sub-parts,  which  can  be  placed  within  the 
categorisation of the Stern and Öjendal map. The choice delimits from the possibility of 
saying anything about how well the DCA preforms as part of the security-development 
nexus.
5.2.4 Application of Milliken?  
Milliken  presents  a  range  of  analytical  tool  available  to  be  used  in  studies  of 
International Relations, as discourse production and reproduction. The use of discourse 
theory and analysis, is made to accommodate the model of a nexus which inhabits many 
different  ideas,  narratives  and  perception  of  what  it  constitutes  and  how  it  is  use. 
Milliken frames a “system of signification” as a system of signs (often but not always 
language) creating spaces of objects, in which the agent(s) can navigate.  The mapping 
of  Stern  and  Öjendal  acknowledge  the  security-development  nexus,  not  as  a  single 
discourse,  but  rather  as  a  space  inhabiting  multiple  discourses.  They  argument  of 
different  narratives  in  the  nexus  relies  on  a  predicate  analysis  of  over  30  years  of 
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academia and policy-making within development and security policy and issues. It is 
there spaces of objects which constitutes the different narratives for Stern and Öjendal, 
which are used to describe the reality of the policy under scrutiny. 
The  exercise  in  analysing  the  hypothesis  of  an  incoherence  between  policy,  public 
perception  and  implementation,  is  to  navigate  the  different  discourses  to  determine 
which is dominating, and what bulk of knowledge these hold, in terms of the outlined 
narratives  of  the  nexus  map.  Finding  the  dominating  discourses  within  the  different 
empirical realities and being able to compare these realities to each other, requires the 
tools which Milliken through the play of practice provides.
This study of incoherence between different empirical realities are in its entirety what 
Milliken calls a study of juxtaposition within discourse. The juxtaposition is engaged to 
find  incoherence  between  “the  truth”  of  a  discourse  and  “the  reality”  found  in  the 
empirical realm. In this thesis the reality of juxtaposition is the nexus map, whereas the 
truth are embedded in the discourses.
Since the methodological choice have been made, to narrow the scope of the analysis to 
coincide  within  the  boundaries  of  the  mapped  nexus  (of  Stern  and  Öjendal),  the 
juxtaposition attached to the hypothesis is that of (in)coherence between the truths in the 
public perception discourse of the DCA, along with the implementation discourse, and 
the reality defined in the DCA policy discourse. 
The analytical strength found in  Milliken's work with discourse theory in international 
relations  have be  utilised in  this  thesis  through deconstructive  method clarifying the 
dominating issues within the empirical bulks, along with the application of method of 
“subjugated  knowledge”  connecting  these  dominating  issues  with  a  broader 
understanding of either security or development within the mapped nexus. Even though 
Milliken through the presentation of play of practice introduce the genealogical method, 
this have not been employed in the thesis. The reason being, that genealogical method 
understands discourses as inhabiting a limited space only suitable for one dominating 
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discourse.  This  break with the idea first  and foremost,  that  the security-development 
nexus  can  inhabit  different  narratives  or  discourses  at  the  same  time.  Though  the 
reproduction of one over another might yield a dominating discourse within the field, the 
choice made to accept the constructivist condition of Stern & Öjendal's map, detaches 
from the possibility of not one dominating discourse, but of one surviving discourse.
The CDA main paper from 2004, which are the whole reasons for this thesis, will be 
handled by deconstructive method first, as part of the overall policy discourse. From this 
deconstruction, the rest of the policy papers can be analysed and a common discourse 
can be found.
Unlike the DCA policy discourse, the discourse of the public perception to the DCA 
have no metaphoric baseline from which the rest of the narratives within the discourse 
can be tuned. So the use of privileged actors and their articulations, and the reliability of 
the  status  I  have  provided  them in  the  thesis,  are  decisive  for  analytical  value  and 
validity. All of the articulations of the privileged actors, are echoed in other sources, so 
that they do not stand alone. I have made a choice, that the sources should be spread out  
across the temporal extent of the DCA, and be connected in the subject matter to the 
DCA.
5.3 Delimitation 
Stern and Öjendal refers to a discursive inquisition of the security-development nexus 
nature reveals hidden purposes and interests. And while this might be the case, the thesis 
refrains from determining or guess the nature of set intentions and interests from a given 
political decision or programme enforcement from the discursive analysis. While this 
might lead to some interesting antics, the application of such analysis might be limited to 
crystal balling. On the other hand might a analysis of a policy and programme, while not 
revealing hidden agendas and interests, illuminate the possible scholarly approaches used 
to forge the policy. As a technique of government, the social sciences are closely related, 
which are supposed to bridge the gap between ideology and implementable reality of 
policies and programmes. So what Stern and Öjendal hints to as “certain purposes and 
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interests”  might  instead  be  seen  as  a  limitation  of  possible  theoretical  or  scholarly 
approaches to mechanical or technical solutions, to ideologies and policies. The choices 
available through the mapping of Stern and Öjendal are manifold, and can lead to many 
diverse  analysis  of  subject  matters  surrounding  the  security-development  nexus.  But 
since the problem field of this thesis argues that even though there might be a number of 
reasons why the DCA does not work, or what might be broken in the implementation, 
the hypothesis remains that it might be due to different discourses of the nexus engaged, 
and different expectation of how the DCA should  encompass the security-development 
nexus.
Interviews could have added another layer of certainty to the proceedings of the public 
discourse.  However  since  the  discourse  have  a  dependency  on  the  temporal  phrase 
related to the subject matter, i.e. the creation and changes of the DCA. The temporal 
trajectory of the DCA extend before and beyond the available reach of the thesis work. 
Interviews of privileged actors could only hope to reveal how the contemporary public 
discourse of the DCA today, and hardly add anything to the public discourse running 
parallel to the DCA policy creation.
It might however have been  interesting to get in depth interviews with the ministers and 
the  political spokesmen and women from all the parties in the current parliament, and 
perhaps even those holding the office from 2004 forth. However the combination of the 
limitation of time in the thesis  work,  the minimal  importance vis-a-vis interest  from 
possible interviewees, and the problem with limited access and political spin, increased 
the difficulty and restricted to possible gain23.
5.4 Empirical considerations
The analytical use of the DCA policy papers as the point of departure, on which the 
implementation  and  public  perception  will  be  considered,  can  be  considered  as  an 
arbitrary  choice.  This  arbitrary  choice  have  been  made  due  to  the  gravity  of 
23 Borchert entertain the idear that the central actors are so loyal and disciplined, that their articulated 
discourse (juxtaposed to the public perception discourse) does not diviate from the policy discourse. 
(Borchert 2009: 43)
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consequences, which weight heavier on the written policy, than the public debate and 
perception. Since the technology of democracy is expected to engage in a linearity from 
public debate to implementation (covering the ground of policy-making in between), the 
real  life  consequences  looms  larger  from  the  policy  papers,  than  from  the  public 
perception24.  Thereby  not  disregarding  the  potential  impact  or  influence  the  public 
perception can have on the policy (especially with feedback loops), nor diminishing the 
truth or reality of the public perception. The arbitrary choice of the DCA policy as point 
of departure is also irrelevant insofar as the hypothesis estimates a difference between 
the empirical bulks, but does not discriminate between right or wrong.
5.4.1 DCA policy choices  
Documents chosen to illuminate the discourse of the DCA policy begins in 2004, as an 
addition to the defence settlement, enforced from 2005 (DCA 2004). From there on out, 
it  is  a matter of following the policy through subsequent defence settlement  (Danish 
Defence Settlement (DDS)), to see if the focus changes from that of 2004. Additional to 
that trajectory of the policy, in time, the mark of the DCA have also been located in the 
development policies and the general policy exclaiming the goals for the Ministry of 
Foreign  Affairs,  and  the  governments  ongoing  development  policy  priorities  (DDPP 
2004 through 2012). In addition will the policy paper “Peace and Stabilisation 2010” be 
used, as it concern Denmark's engagement in fragile state, which becomes a major issue 
in the later policy papers
The empirical material regarding the DCA policy are chosen on account of the relation 
between security and development, which are underlined by the DCA's (2004) innate 
linguistic  preconditions  are  the  combination  of  civilian  and  military  cooperation. 
“Samtænkning af civil og militær indsats I internationale operationer25” establishes the 
cooperation  between  two  overarching  agents  or  agencies,  which  resides  within  the 
civilian parameters and the military parameters. So in order to present a full picture of  
the policy discourse, as it have been formulated over time, and across the span of both 
24 Though a tendency to apply micro management from parliament seem to have intensified.
25 The comprehensive approach is a concerted planning and action of civilian and military efforts.
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security and military policy, and development and general foreign policy.
5.4.2 Privileged actors   
The use of privileged actors is broadly speaking actors who contributed to the public 
perception, through presentation of, or debate on the matters of the DCA. The public 
perception might be best observed through those on constitutes the public, which would 
be the general Danish population. This approach could use the techniques of creating 
empirical material  through surveys (Hansen 2004). But because the analysis  seeks to 
understand how the discourse of the DCA have been created and if there are any internal 
dissonance (between the public discourse and the policy discourse). To find out how the 
public discourse resonate with the policy discourse, the privileged actors chosen, have 
tried to present and discuss the DCA in the public sphere. With the risk of cherry picking 
through  many  contributions  to  the  public  discourse,  I  have  tried  use  to  include 
articulations which bring something new to the proceedings. However, since this is a 
constructivist  approach through the use of  discourses,  I  welcome the possibility that 
there actors, articulations and angels which remain unvisited.
5.5 Analysis apparatus
5.6 Indicators
The analysis  are  based  on the  pinpointing  of  discourses  within  the  empirical  bulks, 
which as stated earlier resides in documents and grey paper alike. To navigate through 
the mesh of empirical noise and find the the pivotal points correlating to the discourse of 
the map, some indicators or guidelines are put in place.
5.6.1 Security or development concerns  
There is differentiation between the concerns in the discourse, and whether this favours 
the security or development side of the matter. This is done partly by acknowledging 
poles of opposition within the discourse, and using the tools of subjugated knowledge to 
instigate the underlying academic discussion. By using this indicator, it clarifies whether 
it should be considerer as originating from security or development, or arguably a nexus, 
somewhere in between. This choice have been made, since the nexus mapping spans the 
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range from security to development, and suggests somewhat endless possible nexuses 
between  elements  of  development  and  elements  of  security.  And  exercising  an 
understanding of the relative position of the empirical  discourses  within the mapped 
nexus, in term of set development and security, allows a comparison between the policy 
papers and the public perception and expectation.
5.6.2 Level of agency (to what actor)  
The level of agency relates to the differences on the map on whether the main agency is  
situated in Denmark, at the state level of the country in question, or at the level of the 
individuals. The matter of where the main agency resides are also brought into question. 
This is done to determine if the main agency are emphasised as being in the hand of the 
consigner state (Denmark), non-state or super-state actors, the target or receiving state, 
or the agency focus lies on the individuals of the subject matter (security,  insecurity, 
development, and underdevelopment). 
5.6.3 Motive and incentive  
The incentive  behind  driving  the  discourse  indicates  a  good distinction  between the 
different mapped discourse. Where there are moral driven discourse that concerns itself 
with  a  subset  of  (sometimes  arbitrary)  moralistic  appreciation  and  aspirations.  The 
incentive  indicator  also focus  the  drive behind the  discourse  and the  goal  this  drive 
encompasses. Some of the mapped discourses are a manifestation of state security, other 
use the aforementioned moralistic approach which are more concerned with individual 
security. Yet others differentiate development of the nation-state such as the European 
state evolved, as opposed to the development of welfare or democracy on the sub-state 
level, or development as a driver for capitalist playability on the global market.
6 Analysis
The analysis addresses the hypothesis and the problem formulation, which respectively 
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is a knowledge of a continues call for change to the policy and practices of the DCA in  
the public sphere, coupled with a suspicion that this perpetual concern has been due to a 
separation  between  the  discourse  in  the  public  sphere  and  subsequent  performance 
expectation of the policy, and the discourse of the policy itself. The problem formulated 
addresses  this  hypothesis  by  using  discourse  theoretical  concepts  to  understand  the 
security-development nexus, and how the different parts of the DCA adheres to it. The 
analysis will address the DCA policy discourses with the different policy papers first, 
using a deconstruction approach to create a coherent discourse. Then the analysis for 
subjugated knowledge will be applied, in order to anchor the knowledge and meaning of 
the discourse to the nexus map. The same approach is then taken to the discourse of the 
public  perception  and  expectation  of  the  DCA.  Which  in  the  end  will  allow  for  a 
discussion of possible dissonance.
6.1 The DCA as a policy
The DCA is both a policy paper from 2004 and spans the following years, where it can 
be traced in the policies concerning defence issues, developmental policies, and foreign 
policy. The challenge is to find the pivotal points of the policy, and trace it through the 
subsequent policies. Since all the policies are not dedicated specifically to deal with the 
DCA issues, the DCA issues must be found from the discursive pivotal points from the 
main document, or direct references to the connection of security and development. 
6.1.1 Deconstruction of DCA main document 2004  
The DCA (DCA 2004) was published in 2004 as an addition to the Danish Defence 
Settlement  (DDS)  for  2005-2009  (published  2004).  The  paragraphs  presented  below 
have been picked from the  policy paper  in  order  to  analyse  the  discursive  narrative 
within it, which subsequently can be juxtaposed with the Danish Defence Settlements, 
and  the  Danish  Development  Political  Priorities  policy  documents.  The  quotation 
represents  the  essence  of  the  policy  as  discursive  manifestation  of  the  security-
development nexus26. 
26 Issues within the DCA, and other policy papers for that matter, which falls beyond the combination of 
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The intention according to the policy paper was to increase the coordination between the 
civilian and military efforts in international operations. The document argues that there is 
a need for this cooperation, or at least an increase of an already existing cooperation and 
this  relates  to  prior  experience  within  ”...  humanitarian  action  and  
rebuilding/reconstruction  aid  in  association  with  the  resolution  of  military  
conflicts”(Own  translation.  DCA 2004:  1).  Whether  there  were  existing  basis  for 
building stronger ties are questioned in academic debate27, though semantics in testing 
the thesis hypothesis. But the noticeable emphasis on the combination of humanitarian 
action and reconstruction efforts as a solution to resolving military conflicts, shows a 
connection in the discourse of the policy, between the goals of the first and the latter. 
That is, that completion of a military engagement is depended on the combination of 
humanitarian and reconstruction efforts.
This relationship between the military component and the civilian one are central to the 
policy.  It  establishes,  as  mentioned,  a  connection  between  humanitarian  efforts, 
development  efforts  and  military  efforts.  And  this  logic  and  the  motive  behind  this 
merging are found in the following statements, which are central in understanding the 
coherency of the policy discourse.
“The purpose of the comprehensive Danish effort in an area of conflict is  to stabilise  
and normalise  the  conditions  (or  situation).  Water  and  electricity  supply,  transport,  
police,  basic  administration,  and  a  functioning  business  life  are  all  fundamental  
prerequisites in reaching this purpose.”. (DCA 2004: 1)
Apart  from  cementing  the  relation  between  “the  Danish  effort” and  the  strive  to 
“stabilise  and  normalise”,  this  statement  presents  poles  of  oppositions,  where  the 
reasons for the need of stabilisation are both found in the recognition that the Danish 
effort regards an area of conflict, and that the lack of water and electricity etc. linked to 
security and development, are discourses in their own right, but does not add considerably to the 
understanding of the DCA as a security-development nexus manifestation.
27 The need for the cooperation are well debated in political and academia. E.g. Stepputat 2009; 2012, 
Jakobsen 2010; Veicherts 2005. Important issues, to be researched further. 
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instability or lack of stability. Additionally it presents the connection between the move 
away from conflict with the effort of normalisation, and the prerequisites of utilities, rule 
of law, governance and capitalist business activity.
The discourse picture which the DCA paints are one of a Danish approach, which aims 
for  stability  first  and  foremost.  The  consequences  of  this  choice,  to  apply  focus  of 
stability distances the purpose of the policy from a focus on military victory against a 
clear traditional enemy, to a fleeting or evanescent concept of stability. Where there can 
be stability in conflict, which allows for constant combat in a certain amount, does not 
necessarily  mean  the  absence  of  violence  for  the  civilian  population.  Another  focus 
which is relinquished with the choice of stability could also be argued to be in terms of  
development, which is to say, that stability in general does not necessarily equal freedom 
from  insecurity,  or  increase  in  development  for  the  individual.  On  the  other  hand, 
regarding the stability, the addition of normalisation and subsequent utility, governance 
and rule  of  law,  suggest  that  “stability”  lies  somewhere  beyond  the  violence  of  the 
conflict. Beyond the stability of war, conflict or oppression.
The normalisation of, or in a conflict area, is represented as the establishment of utilities,  
rules of law, and governance, i.e. so called normal conditions have specific connotations 
attached,  which  coupled  with  stabilisation,  are  utilities,  rule  of  law,  central 
administration and active business life (growth). This suggest an expectation within the 
discourse  that  normality  has  universal  applications.  And  this  expectation  of  what 
normality has to be, are thus disregarding geographical location or the gravity of history 
in the given area (of conflict). This determination of what “normal” conditions contains, 
and the relation this has to the purpose of the policy with the concept of stability, places 
it central in the policy discourse. 
 
“International  crisis  management  are thus  not  only a military task.  For the civilian  
population in a crisis area there will be a direct line between the improvement of the  
socio-economic situation in the area, and the improvement of the security situation. The  
comprehensive  Danish  effort  in  conflict  areas  must  thus  to  a  higher  extent  be  
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coordinated and focused so that an area of conflict as soon as possible can be stabilised  
and normalised. This can contribute to shorten the military operation and secure the  
greatest  possible  effect  in  the  utilisation  of  the  Danish  resources  in  a  international  
coordinated framework.” (DCA 2004: 1)
The  interesting  statements  in  this  extract  are  first  of  all  the  obvious  relocation  of 
international  crisis  management  from  a  purely  military  task,  to  something  beyond 
military involvement, but with connotations maintaining the role of foreign intervention. 
In the case of the Danish contribution of the DCA, the engagement in international crisis  
management arguably involve Danish intervention into an area of crisis, but as stated, 
not necessarily a solely military task. The subsequent statement underline the inherent 
assumption that the solution of crisis and the move away from conflict, is paramount and 
parallel to the assumed expectation of the effected civilian population. It draws on the 
conclusion that there must be a direct connection between  “improvement of the socio-
economic situation in the area, and the improvement of the security situation.” (DCA 
2004:  1)  (Coupled  with  the  understanding  that  these  improvement  lies  beyond  the 
civilian population, with the intervening (invading) military/civil effort.) The distinction 
is important in the discourse, because it propels the burden of the DCA policy on behalf 
of the civilian population. The need for development alongside security becomes a result 
of what is expected by the effected population.
However, the last statement which also holds a central position in the DCA main paper, 
is focused on shortening the military operation and focus on cost efficiency in the Danish 
contribution.  This  is  important  in  the  policy paper,  because  it  draws  on a  complete 
different objective then the other goals. Instead of following the focus of stability and 
normalisation, creating utility, rule of law, and governance, and meet the expectation of 
the civilian population in the effected area, the last part is concerned with the proper use 
of the Danish coffers. The resources could also be understood as a concern over the 
extended threat to the lives of the Danish soldiers operating in the conflict area. Whether 
a concern for minimal spending, or a concern of military casualties, the focus does seem 
cross-eyed using the expectation of the distressed population on one hand and resource 
efficiency concerns on the other. 
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It  could  be  argued  that  a  shorten  military  operation,  which  involve  soldiers  on  the 
ground, and in combat, can avoid an escalation of the conflict28. Bjørn Møller voices this 
concern in the article “The Somali Conflict: The role of external actors” (2009), and so 
does Stuart Gordon in his work  “Winning Hearts and Minds?” (2011). However while 
that might be the outcome, it does not show as a consideration in the policy. On the 
contrary, the policy describes a need for a military presence in order to make the civilian 
part  of  stabilisation  and  normalisation  work.  And  with  the  stressed  focus  on  cost 
efficiency of the Danish resources, this argument hardly takes root. 
The rest of the policy paper is concerned with reshuffling of the Danish defence and 
administrative  tasks,  along  with  the  established  of  a  secretariat  tasked  with  the 
cooperation and coordination of the relevant tasks, across the different ministries and 
departments. However interesting, not adding in relevance to the discourse of the policy 
as part of a security-development nexus.
6.1.2 The DCA policy discourse in the Defence Settlements.  
The Danish Defence Settlements (DDS) are agreements made by the government and by 
tradition includes as much of parliament as possible, in order to gain a more consensus 
based agreement which can function beyond the term of contemporary government. The 
three defence settlements included here were formulated in 2004, 2009, and 2012, to be 
launched the subsequent year. Following the discourse of the DCA through the DDS 
requires  the  DDS  to  offer  either  direct  reference  to  the  DCA,  or  the  inclusion  of 
development or development related issues. Since the DDS has a primary mandate of 
how to organise the Danish Defence in the settlement period, the amount of the DCA 
only plays a natural minor part. 
28 Robert Petersen 2012 argues that the presence of forces can escalate a conflict. Ken Menkhaus 2010 
and Bjørn Møller also 
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6.1.2.1 The DDS 2005-2009  
The  DDS  2005-2009  (from 2004)  describes  the  organisation  and  structuring  of  the 
Danish military.  The DCA does have a presence in the settlement,  but hold a minor 
overall role. The majority is dedicated to more practical matters within the organisation 
of  the  Danish  military,  such  as  concerns  of  outsourcing,  manpower  and  equipment 
purchase. 
The  DDS  strive  to  “strengthened  coordination  between  the  military  and  civilian,  
humanitarian effort in a focus area” (DDS 2004: 1), and uses the background of acts of 
terrorism in  and  after  2001  as  motivation  for  this  increase  in  coordination  between 
military  and  civilian  actors.  The  reasoning  in  for  this  need  relates  to   the  “(N)ew 
asymmetrical  and  unpredictable  threats  in  form  of  international  terrorism  and  
proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  and  their  delivery  methods,  have  
emerged.”  (DDS  2004:  2).  Likewise,  the  coordination  between  military  efforts  and 
civilian and humanitarian contribution is being employed to counter a wide range of 
threats towards Denmark29;  “...the defence henceforth be adapted on a capacity based  
approach, so that a wide range of capacities can accommodate situations, where Danish  
security or Danish interests directly or indirectly are threatened or affected, or where the  
Danish responsibility in international relations dictate it.” (DDS 2004: 2). Where this is 
a major departure from the motivation within the DCA 2004 paper, it must understood 
that the DDS is primarily occupied with the reasoning and organisation if the Danish 
military,  and  any  concerns  for  a  comprehensive  approach,  comes  in  second  place. 
However,  this  motivation  is  used  as  an  argument  to  coordinate  and  cooperate  with 
civilian authorities; “The unpredictable character of the threats demands an increased  
focus on operational preparedness and the ability to deploy capacities where they are  
needed,  whether  that  might  be  a  humanitarian  effort,  peace  supporting  operation,  
emergency situation (catastrophe response), in or beyond Denmark or actual military  
operations.” (DSS 2004: 2)
29 Note that the DDS's main provocative is the security and preservation of the Danish realm, but 
invoking the need for cooperation with the development sector, invokes the DCA, and thus must the 
motivation be considered.
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Another central  statement in the DDS 2004, which is  also present in the DCA main 
paper,  is  the  incentive  to  use  the  DCA to  shorten  the  military  engagement,  while 
increasing the military responsibility in the area of conflict:  “Thus can and must the  
Defence  to  significantly  larger  degree  then  before,  participate  in  peace  supporting  
assignments,  including  conflict  prevention,  peace-keeping,  peace  creating,  
humanitarian, and other similar assignments.
The relevant actors must be brought together as early as possible in the preparation of  
deployment of Danish military contingents, so that it becomes possible from the very  
beginning to define the need for possible relevant civilian stabilisation efforts in the  
military deployment area. A concentrated effort and mutual utilisation of military and  
civilian experience in this context will enable the achievement of better results and thus  
all thing considered also a shorten need for a military presence.” (DSS 2004: 4)
Additionally,  the  DDS  seeks  to  meet  expectations  of  responsibility  within  the 
international community as part  of the DCA, and using the DCA to impact both the 
international community and  possibly the domestic  parliament and public;  “There is  
concord,  that  a  coordination  of  the  military  and  civilian  efforts  in  international  
operations  must  be  strengthen,  to  achieve  synergy  between  the  efforts,  so  that  the  
comprehensive Danish effort becomes visible.” (DSS 2004: 18)
 
6.1.2.2 The DDS 2010-2014  
The main aspect of the DSS 2010-2014 (2009) concerns itself predominantly with the 
(re)organisation of the Danish military, just as the previous did, and the DCA only holds 
a small part within the document. And it also changed the tone slightly from overall 
stabilisation and humanitarian efforts, to more strictly military capacity building. Where 
the  DCA  main  paper  (DCA  2004)  took  off  from  concepts  of  stabilisation  and 
normalisation, and the military cooperative role with the civilian initiatives, the DDS 
2010-2014 conveys how the main issues of development from a military perspective is 
that of military capacity building.
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It  establishes the role of the security policy as being central  in the proactive Danish 
foreign and security policy;  “The Defence have in the light  of  the recent  decade of  
security political development continuously inhabited the role as one of the central tools  
in a proactive Danish foreign and security policy, which can contribute to prevention of  
conflicts  and  war,  as  well  as  promoting  democracy  and  freedom  in  the  world  with  
respect for the universal human rights.” (DDS 2009: 1). And what is interesting is the 
coupling, in a document regarding the use of the Danish defence, between the prevention 
of conflicts and war, with promotion of democracy, freedom and human rights.
And  Denmark  is  not  alone  in  the  prevention  of  conflicts  and  war,  since;  “Western 
military  forces,  including  the  Danish  Defence,  must  continuously  be  able  to  fight  
conventional conflicts, but there will increasingly be a need to be able to participate in  
other  types  of  conflicts,  including  counterinsurgency,  peace-building,  and  rebuilding  
assistance … The international assignments will typical fall within the main areas of  
expertise;  armed  conflict,  stabilisation  assignments,  and  international  guardian  of  
order.” (DDS 2009: 2) The inclusion of the cooperation is important since it cements the 
Danish  desire  and  need  for  collaboration  in  the  international  community.  It  is  also 
highlighted, that the area of expertise is armed conflict, stabilisation assignments, and 
international  guardian of order. Whilst the latter is more or less a blank cheque which 
can mean anything or nothing, the focus on armed conflict and stabilisation is important. 
It is so because, it can be the polar opposite of the just aforementioned willingness to 
participate in peace-building and rebuilding assistance. 
“It is evident from the Defence Commission report30 that there is an increasing need in  
the future, for the Defence to be able to contribute to military capacity building, conflict  
preventive  measures,  as  well  as  concurrently  amongst  other  things,  resolutions  of  
stabilisation  assignments  in  an  area  of  conflict.  Concurrently,  it  is  the  forward  
expectation that the goal of the stabilisation operations – and partly the armed conflicts  
– can only be achieved through integration of military and civilian instruments in the  
area of operation. On one hand this means, that the established comprehensive work  
30 Defence Commission Report from 2008
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must be maintained and developed further. On the other hand, does this entail that the  
achievement  of  military  objectives  often rely  on civilian directed  objectives,  such as  
rebuilding.  To  ensure  future  military  and  overall  political  success  in  international  
operations, it is by default paramount that the defence continuously to a limited degree  
can  contribute  to  the  rebuilding  –  especially  in  areas  of  operation,  where  civilian  
rebuilding capacities either can not or will not operate due to the security situation. This  
can typically be the case where the security situation in an period of transition hinders  
civilian actors in operating.”  (DSS 2009: 4-5) This long extract from the DDS 2009 
encompass a kind of cognitive dissonance. Because it articulates, like the previous quote, 
that the Danish military first and foremost only should contribute with military capacity 
building and conflict prevention (in terms of the DCA), however also be ready to engage 
in general rebuilding efforts, where civilians fail to do so. 
Furthermore,  the  DDS 2009  goes  to  length  explaining  the  role  of  military  capacity 
building, and in that process does not mention either general or development minded 
tasks. “Military capacity building: Experience from the defence insertion in stabilisation  
operations indicates that it is paramount in a international mission, that there are build  
local competent security structures, including military capacities. There are thus a great  
need for the defence to have the capacity to educate and train local security forces, so  
that they will build the capacity to resolve local conflicts and take responsibility for the  
solution of security tasks. This education and training programme can span wide, from 
e.g. education of foreign personnel in Denmark, to a dispatch of staff contribution to  
counties  with  a  military  development  need,  or  the  dispatch  of  educational  teams to  
educate  local  security  forces  in  a  mission  area  before,  during,  or  after  a  potential  
conflict. The defence has previously not dedicated capacities to these sorts of tasks. The  
capacity to solve such tasks have thus been limited, by having to be established from  
time to next, by drawing personnel from the existing defence force. This have contributed  
to  strain  of  the  personnel.  The  defence  will  also  to  a  degree  participate  in  more  
traditional  capacity  building  assignments,  such  as  exemplified  in  the  Balkans,  in  
Ukraine, and Georgia.” (DSS 2009: 9) 
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6.1.2.3 DDS 2013-2017  
The DCA is all but present in the DDS 2013-2017 (2012). Only a few quotes can be 
related to the DCA, and role of the military are gradually being regarded as suitable 
mostly for capacity building of military capacities;  “Contribution to a comprehensive  
force  across  military  services  and  departments,  e.g.  a  task  force  to  humanitarian  
operations or support to special operational forces … Contribution to military capacity  
building and military support to civilian capacity building” (DDS 2012: 7)
6.1.3 The development side of the DCA policy  
Trying  to  establish  the  pure  development  side  in  regard  to  the  DCA discourse,  the 
empirical material spans the Danish Development Political Priorities (DDPP) from 2005 
to 2013. The search in this part of the policy discourse is counter to that of the DDS. 
Which is to say, that the expectation diving into this empirical material, is to find traces 
of the cooperation and coordination of development and security, and especially looking 
for any crossover into security or were a line from the DCA 2004 paper can be drawn.
However,  the policy papers,  all  9 of them, allocate little to no attention to the DCA 
concept, and regards it with feeling of a side note to the overarching and more important 
development issues. When the DCA is mentioned, the wording is often directly copied 
from the 2004 DCA paper.
However, there are some interesting tie-ins with the narrative of the DCA. The DDPP 
2005-2009 (2004) carries the title  “Security, growth – development”, which in it self 
priorities (unspecified) security,  and economical growth ahead of development.  Apart 
from odd priorities for a development paper, it does tie nicely in with the DCA. The 
narrative in this document presents poles of opposition where the development policy 
becomes an instrument to secure the discursive more important objectives of security 
and growth; “The development policy is among Denmark's most important instruments  
in promoting a world of security and growth with development for all. The government  
has since its accession focused on the development policy as a integrated part of an  
active Danish foreign policy.” (DDPP 2004: 6). The development policy does not stand 
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alone, but is rather a precursor for the goals of security and growth. An expectation of 
the  development  priorities  does  not  boggle  the  mind  as  to  be  concentrated  around 
development goals, however the DDPP 2004 articulates here, that there is an incentive to 
use development as an instrument for other (foreign policy) achievements and not solely 
for development goals.
One of the themes which plays a particular role in the narratives of the DCA and the 
DDS paper(s), is the concern with a changing threat assessment, which falls beyond the 
threat of conventional war into asymmetrical treats (terrorism) which goes beyond the 
military  capability.  In  the  DDPP 2004  it  is  explained  why  there  is  a  need  for  a  
comprehensive  approach,  i.e.  an  inclusion  of  development  tools,  in  overcoming  the 
threats  and  reach  stabilisation  and  normalisation.  “Economical  stagnation  and  
unemployment leads accordingly to a great migration pressure, which threatens to drain  
the individual societies of the well educated. Rampant poverty, and the lack of education  
and  information,  lack  of  jobs  and  future  prospects,  lack  of  legitimate  democratic  
channels,  through  which  the  frustration  and  discontent  can  be  expressed,  leads  in  
several countries to alienation and internal turmoil. This can create a breeding ground  
for extremism and terrorism.” (DDPP 2004: 9) 
The course of events which in this narrative leads to alienation and internal turmoil and 
subsequent extremism and terrorism are somewhat in line with the idea in the DCA 2004 
paper, where betterment of water, utilities, rule of law, and governance, were presented 
as important to develop as the security situation enhanced. However, in the DDPP 2004 
it is the absence of these attributes which eventually leads to or causes an unstable and 
insecure situation, whereas in the DCA 2004 narrative the security efforts are unable to 
succeed  in  creating  stabilisation  if  these  attributes  are  absent.  Since  the  DCA 2004 
security is unable to create stabilisation and normalisation by its own merits without 
development, and DDPP 2004 tells that the lack of development (not security) leads to 
fragmentation, alienation, and subsequent insecurity, it could be argued that the role of 
security in the DCA is only active once the development fail. And that the securitisation 
efforts from military involvement are extremely limited getting a conflict area out of 
conflict,  and  into  stabilisation  and  normalisation  –  where  developmental  effort  are 
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recognised as remedies and precaution. This argument is important, because it shows the 
workings of the discourse. Or more precisely it shows the connection of the importance 
between lack of stability and normality, and the escalation insecurity.
Reason for using a comprehensive Danish approach in areas of conflict are echoed from 
the DCA 2004, where the need for stabilisation and normalisation is stressed (DDPP 
2004: 20). And the crossover from humanitarian to military support tasks are brought 
forward; “As part of the new comprehensive approach initiative will the humanitarian 
appropriation be  increased  with  up  to  15m  DDK  a  year  to  secure  resources  for  
stabilisation efforts, which can create concrete improvements for the local population in  
an areas, where the Danish military is engaged.” (DDPP 2004: 20 genuine emphasis). 
Though the resource allocation of 15m in the larger scheme is a very low figure, the 
narrative suggests that humanitarian efforts should focus on stabilisation directly as part 
of a military engagement in an area, and that the need of the humanitarian action aims to 
support a military.
6.1.3.1 The DDPP 2005 through 2013  
The DDPP 2006-2010 (2005) calls for a continuation of the DDPP 2004, and adds that 
the development policy;  “can and must be actively used in  an efficient effort against  
some of  the international  terrorism’s  underlying causes”  (DDPP 2005:  14 genuine 
emphasis),  which  is  a  slight  move  from the  causes  as  a  possible  connection  to  the 
formation  of  terrorism,  to  a  simplified  cause  and  effect  perspective.  Otherwise,  the 
DDPP  2005  only  calls  for  a  continued  and  strengthening  of  the  civil-military 
comprehensive approach. (DDPP 2005: 15)
The DCA policy discourse are  barely present  in  the DDPP 2007-2011 (2006) paper, 
where  the  only  reference  to  the  DCA is;  “In  crisis-torn  areas  must  the  military  
engagement not stand alone. It must be combined with humanitarian and rebuilding aid.  
In situations which hinders civilian organisations aid effort, is the government ready to  
allow the military forces to resolve these assignments through an active  civil-military  
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cooperation.” (DDPP 2006:  16  genuine  emphasis).  This  stance  on  military  use  in 
civilian humanitarian and development  action,  is  later dismissed (DDS 2009),  as the 
critique from the development sector sparked.
Increased focus on fragile states, stabilisation and conflict prevention, and the promotion 
of the comprehensive approach in international organisations, in the DDPP 2007. Which 
now not only  refers to areas of crisis, or in conflict, but now fragile states are in focus. 
(DDPP 2007) The following year, in DDPP 2008, any coordination, cooperation or any 
other sort of DCA remains absent.
In the DDPP 2009, as addition to the priority of increased focus on fragile states, the 
government focuses on a “broader stabilisation efforts … for stabilisation and conflict  
prevention as part of the development aid. The government will establish a structure for  
a  comprehensive  approach  of  civilian  and  military  efforts  with  participation  of  the  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministry.” (DDPP 2009: 5)
The DDPP 2010 is all about stability and fragility. Partly financing the comprehensive 
approach  to  stabilisation  efforts,  and partly  allocation  of  finance  for  efforts  towards 
stability and conflict  prevention,  including strengthening civilian capacity in  military 
operations. Though this is a bit timid description, it is the only description related to the 
DCA in DDPP 2010.
In DDPP 2011 fragile states and states in conflict are articulated as global challenge for 
security, poverty eradication, and economical development.  “The government wants to  
conduct an active and responsible security policy aimed at the causes of conflict, threats  
and  terror,  before  they  appear  or  reappear,  and  contribute  to  consolidation  in  the  
immediate post-conflict phase. An active security policy must focus on prevention and 
capacity building.” (DDPP 2011: 10  genuine emphasis). There is a scent of the spirit of 
the DDS and the DCA, in that it emphasises state-building components. However it does 
articulate a distance to the military, by keeping the focus of the development part (in 
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consolidation) in the post-conflict phase. However, it is noteworthy that a “responsible  
security policy” end up amongst development priorities.
DDPP 2013-2017 (2012) continues the line of tacitly following the DCA as a side note,  
and otherwise note that in the pursuit of stabilisation and protection, the government will 
once  again  actively  engage  in  and  improve;  “the  task  of  conflict  prevention,  
stabilisation, and rebuilding in fragile and conflict torn states” (DDPP 2012). Nothing 
extraordinarily  about  that,  but  a  sharpened  focus  on  stabilisation  as  being  aimed  at 
fragile and conflict torn states.
6.1.3.2 Peace and stabilisation  
The  government  released  in  2010  a  policy  paper  titled  “Peace  and  stabilisation  –  
Denmark's policy for engagement in fragile states 2010-2015”. The main focus of the 
DCA main emphasised on stabilisation, and this was further developed in the DDSs and 
the DDPPs as being predominantly a  focus  in  states  of  fragility.  Reasons being that 
fragile states are furthest from achieving the 2015 UN Millennium Goals, and because; 
“Fragile states can in extreme cases become a safe haven for terrorists, who direct their  
plots against us and our democracy.” (Peace and stabilisation 2010: 4) Because the DCA 
is a cornerstone in this policy paper, and since it is understood in the DCA main, that  
stabilisation and normalisation in the conflict areas are the main concern for the aid and 
efforts, this paper can help understand what such efforts entail. And since state fragility, 
through the DDSs and the DDPPs are perceived as the main challenge or stage for the 
DCA, it makes sense to understand the connection between state fragility and the need 
for stabilisation and normalisation.
The DCA is viewed as a way to draw on the many different tools available, to use in the 
field;  “the  different  instruments  must  be  more  cohesive  in  the  field” (Peace  and 
stabilisation 2010: 8), to achieve certain objectives. These objectives are chosen on the 
rationale that “ ... our efforts henceforth must be concentrated on fewer countries and on  
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fewer focus areas in the individual countries31” (Peace and stabilisation 2010: 9). The 
area of focus is state building, stabilisation, livelihood and economical possibilities, good 
governance and human rights,  conflict  prevention and regional  conflict  management. 
(Peace and stabilisation 2010) The combination of the focus on state building and so on, 
in the fragile states, and using the DCA as the means to these goals, is a departure from a 
more classical  development  approach,  where the needs  of  the  people are  adapted  to 
whatever development effort engaged. This focus on fragile states does not concern itself 
with what the population need, but what the state need, and the security issues related to 
stabilisation and conflict management.
The “Peace and stabilisation” paper add to the DCA policy discourse by showing why 
and where there is need for stabilisation and normalisation.
31 The reasons being an overextension of the resources amongst many countries.
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6.1.4 Recapitulation of the deconstructive DCA policy discourse  
The  deconstructive  approach  to  the  DCA policy  discourse  sought  to  identify  the 
workings of the policy part of the discourse. Which parts are important in understanding 
motives and connections, and poles of opposition in the discourse. As for the recap; the 
discourse  of  the  DCA policy  is  about  the  collaboration  between  civilian  NGO's, 
development and humanitarian aid, and military efforts, in areas of conflict. The areas of 
conflict has increasingly been focussed around the fragile state. The DCA policy engages 
in efforts of stabilisation and normalisation. The military actors were firstly excepted to 
enforce the role of development and humanitarian aid, but through the development of 
the policy, mainly as security support for the development sector in during conflict, and 
aid with military capacity building before, during and after conflicts. The development 
and humanitarian aid are expected to work closely together with the military, in the field, 
but also in the planning and evaluation phase. The expectation of the area of conflict in 
interest, and the regard for normality and stability, are the absence of conflict along with 
central  state  building.  State-building  efforts,  and efforts  within  the  DCA aiming  for 
stabilisation and normalisation, are expected to improve facilities such as water and other 
utilities,  rule  of  law,  governance,  government  and  administration.  The  aim  of 
stabilisation and normalisation,  especially in fragile states, is to counter the threat of 
extremism and terrorism towards the international society, and Denmark.
The purpose of the DCA is also to ensure optimal use of the Danish resources, making a 
call  for  cost  efficiency  in  the  use  of  the  military  and  the  development  sector.  A 
shortening of the military engagement is also an important incentive for the DCA policy 
discourse,  along with a  broadening of  its  contingency (to  be involved in  efforts  not 
traditionally linked to military use). The visibility of this Danish policy is an important 
factor in the discourse, as the shortening of the military engagement and the increased 
spotlight, goes beyond immediate matter of security or development.
Lastly, the role of the DCA plays an increasingly smaller role through the policy papers. 
Though the individual components, such as the need to conclude a military operation 
with a sense stability, as well as the need for the aid of utilities in the post-conflict areas,  
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and rule of law, central administration and business, are all included in the development 
and security papers respectively. The connection to the rest of the policies on the security 
and development front respectively, are becoming less visible in the policy papers. This 
is hardly a surprise considering the relative allocation of resources to the DCA.
6.1.5 The subjugated knowledge in the DCA discourses  
The subjugated knowledge from Milliken's discursive approach to international relations 
suggest that every decision in a discourse are guided by an underlying knowledge or 
routines. This background of concepts are the structure upon which a new discourse can 
be forged. As described by Giddens it is the content of a practical knowledge, which 
guides the agent through the world of social structures or object spaces, but once this set 
of knowledge is challenged, it can be altered through other perceptions and perspectives 
(Milliken 1999; Kaspersen 2001)32.  Concepts, exclamations and articulations within a 
certain discursive framework are only the tip of the iceberg, and contains within it (or 
below it) a vast structure guiding, enabling, and limiting the concepts constituting the 
reality  for  the  agent.  And  in  this  case  of  international  relations,  the  subjugated 
knowledge  relates  to  preceding  discourses  and  academic  knowledge,  which  enables, 
limits and structures the policy discourse of the DCA. The following will discuss how 
the  DCA  policy  discourse  fit  into  Stern  and  Öjendal's  nexus  mapping,  through 
subjugated knowledge.
6.1.5.1 Stabilisation at the centre  
A discussion of the consequences of stabilisation in the discourse must be made, because 
it  holds  such  a  central  and  consistent  position  within  and  throughout  the  policy 
discourse. And stabilisation can inhabit different meanings depending on tradition and 
bias from either the development or security sector.  By itself  stabilisation should not 
raise suspicion, which makes it hard to locate within the nexus map, because it expresses 
a  state  equilibrium which opposing position would be instability.  And no matter  the 
32 While the practice knowledge or consciousness of Giddens structuration theory are not the same as the 
subjugated knowledge, it does inhabit some of the same qualities.
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immediate implications, instability is not in itself a desired state. Neither through the 
various  categories  of  development,  nor  is  security.  Though  there  could  be  made  an 
argument for instability as a transitional state from an undesirable situation for a person, 
community,  or  society,  towards  stability  in  a  more  desired  situation.  E.g.  “the  Arab 
Spring” is often hailed as a transition to betterment from democracy, disregarding the 
violence in the process. But considering the connotations attached to stabilisation, i.e. 
why is there a need for stabilisation, what needs to gain stability, and how is stabilisation 
achieved,  a  picture  of  the  composition  emerges.  And  naturally  it  is  essential  to 
understand how stabilisation, as part of a civil-military approach in the DCA, relates to 
both security and development respectively.
6.1.5.2 Stabilisation, fragility and terrorism  
The need for stabilisation is expressed throughout the DCA policy papers. In the DCA 
main  paper  (2004)  the  very  purpose  of  the  comprehensive  Danish  efforts  is  the 
stabilisation and normalisation of the conditions (DCA 2004: 1). And in the “Peace and 
stabilisation”  paper  from  2010  and  in  the  early  DDPP documents  the  stabilisation 
approach becomes pivotal because the lack of stability in the prior adds to a downward 
spiral  into state  fragility,  and in  the  latter  becomes the  precursor  for  extremism and 
terrorism, which endanger the resolution of conflict and eventually Denmark. “Fragile  
states are one of the most significant challenges towards international development and  
security today.”  (Peace and stabilisation 2010: 2) This connection between a lack of 
stability, i.e. state fragility, shows a need for stabilisation for reasons of security in the 
international society, but especially in Denmark (due to the origin of the policy). This 
fear of, or proclaimed permeation of, security threats and risks from fragile states and 
development countries towards Denmark, shows a detachment from the both security 
and development concern in the conflict area33. Which plays on a number of keys in the 
nexus map.
33 There are discussion about how much of a security threat to Denmark and other Western states, fragile 
states and possible terrorism constitute; “The war gave rise to what was supposed to be prevented, 
namely, the spread of terrorist violence – Iraq has become the playground and recruitment centre of 
global terrorism” (Beck 2009: 10). For more see; Menkhaus 2004; Andersen 2005; Andersen et al. 
2007.
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First of all it constitute a threat to security that goes beyond the state, where it becomes a 
security threat to the international community (including Denmark), suggesting it is a 
matter  of  liquidity,  which  Ulrich  Beck  recognises  as  a  globalised  risk  management 
attempt (Beck 2006; 2009, Stern & Öjendal 2010). The acknowledgement of terrorism 
and organised crime, as a result of instability in areas of conflict, and fragility in states, is 
a broadening of the security concept in it self.
It can be argued, that the DCA policy tries to engage stability measures in an area of 
conflict, outside the Danish borders, even beyond neighbouring states, as a recognition 
of the liquidity of threats  permeating the international  community,  and thus counters 
should  be  found  through international  relations.  This  argument  can  be  found in  the 
defence  settlements  (DDS 2004;  2009),  where  a  greater  cooperation  with  the  super 
national organisations, NATO and UN, and through this argument adopt a map position 
of globalised security. However the support for NATO and UN is made as part of the 
military resolve to secure Denmark, and is not directly articulated as part of the DCA. 
Although the DCA as part of international conflict resolution and the use in international 
operations is a factor in the policy papers.
The argument that the DCA stabilisation efforts are needed to protect Denmark from 
terrorism can support the argument of the DCA as globalised security. But since there 
can be doubts about the scale of a potential security threat towards Denmark, beyond the 
result of a military engagement (Beck 2009). Coupled with the articulation that the DCA 
is also a tool to  “... shorten the military operation” (DCA 2004: 1), and the need for 
visibility of the Danish effort (DSS 2004: 18) could suggest that the incentive behind the 
stabilisation efforts are not aimed at the actors in the conflict area, but rather a concern of 
the  Danish  constituency.  David  Chandler  addresses  this  rather  dystopic  in  his 
contribution  to  the  security-development  nexus  debate,  in  which  he  describes  the 
engagement  in  the  nexus,  not  as  a  technology  to  address  issues  of  security  or 
development,  but  rather  “anti-foreign”  policy,  which  gains  recognition  within  the 
international  community  and  domestic  constituency  (Chandler  2007).  Considering  a 
larger concern for the Danish troops and resources,  along with a perceived threat  to 
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domestic security, can arguably be seen as a technique of governmentality. 
The need for visibility of the DCA efforts, in the need to get the soldiers out of war as 
soon  as  possible  could  be  argued  to  be  a  technique  of  governmentality,  where  the 
political  constituency in  Danish population weighs heavier  than creating solutions  to 
development and security problems within the area of conflict.
The reason why it is a technique of governmentality rather than a matter of post-security, 
is that the issues of the DCA could be critiqued as a post-security approach to security-
development matters. But the discourse of the DCA, though not arguing verbally against 
the post-security concept, does not call for a “de-securitisation”, but instead engage in 
securitisation turning development issues into security problems. The causality between 
the need for a developmental stabilisation effort as a solution to military conflict and 
insecurity creates a securitisation of the Danish engagements.
The DCA policy discourse harbours an understanding of certain qualities of the state, 
within the need for stabilisation. The need for stabilisation is made as a remedy for state 
fragility, which through the tools articulated describes a certain type of state, equal to 
those  of  the  European/western  temporal  evolution.  The  DDS  approach  to  the  DCA 
discourse is a contribution to military capacity building, which supports a central state, 
whilst the DCA main paper and the DDPP's addresses the need for a more complete 
package of development initiative. Where water and utility are classical development 
issues, the articulation of rule of law, administration, liberal marked efforts (capitalist 
business life), along with the aforementioned military capacity building from the DDS, 
suggest  a  state-building  effort.  This  is  a  very teleological  approach  to  development, 
which rely on a strong central state.
The whole notion that state fragility is such a large factor in the development papers of 
the DCA discourse, bears witness to a detachment from the human development side of 
the  nexus  map.  The  quest  for  ascending  the  areas  of  conflict  and  fragile  states  to 
normality, assumes a preceding level of statehood34, which might not have existed in the 
34 For more on state-building in fragile states, see Ken Menkhaus' extensive work. Among other; 
“Governance wihtout Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State-building, and the Poltics of Coping” 
(2006) and“Somalia: Governance vs. Statebuilding” (2008)
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first  place  (Andersen  2007).  The  argument  that  only  a  specific  way  of  the  life  is 
acceptable in terms of statehood, lies within the scope of development as a technique of 
Governmentality (Duffield 2010).  The critique of Governmentality in development is 
argued to be; “practices of development, ostensibly designed to 'uplift' first states, and  
later societies and people, are techniques of government that separate lives worth living  
from those that are expendable, dangerous, or insufficient and unacceptable because of  
their incompleteness.” (Stern & Öjendal 2010: 13).
6.1.5.3 Recapitulation of the policy discourse  
The agency of the military must create stabilisation on the basis on an incentive to create 
security  in  the  international  community,  and  keep  Denmark  secure  from  possible 
eventual threats from extremism and terrorism, created in fragile states.
The  agency  of  the  NGOs  on  the  development  side  of  the  DCA,  must  assist  in 
stabilisation  and  normalisation  by  developing  the  central  states  structure,  on  the 
incentive of shortening the military operation.
The development done by the military is mainly within the category of force protection, 
along with  military capacity  building,  as  part  of  a  security  sector  reform stabilising 
fragile states, and general state-building.
6.1.6 Deconstruction of Public Discourse  
The public discourse have a fractured nature, insofar as it is composed of many different 
actors as opposed to the policy discourse which is considered coming from the same 
consigner i.e. the state. However, the analysis here is a deconstruction of the discourse as 
a whole, even though it is spread across various actors. As explained in the empirical 
choices earlier, public DCA discourse's privileged actors are chosen
The aim is to create as full a picture of the public perception as possible.
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Once again, the deconstructive method is used to find the vain of the discourse so that it 
through  the  subsequent  analysis  of  subjugated  knowledge,  can  be  challenged  in  its 
orthodox meaning and placed in the security-development nexus map.
In 2004, in connection with the launch of the DCA main policy paper, the Minister of 
Defence and  Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Svend Aage Jensby and Per Stig 
Møller,  published  a  feature  in  Berlingske  Tidende  to  support  and  explain  it.  With 
reference to  contemporary events  in  Iraq,  the ministers  explained that  progress  were 
slow, and the need for the civilian Iraqi population to see progress in the socio-economic 
development along side the military victories and subsequent asymmetric challenge of 
insurgents. They write;
“For the civilian population in a conflict area there will be a direct line between the  
improvement of the socio-economic situation in the area, and the improvement of the  
security situation.  International crisis management are thus not only a military task.  
Water and electricity supply, transport, police, basic administration, and a functioning  
business  life  are all  fundamental  prerequisites  in  reaching this  purpose.” (Møller  & 
Jensby 2004). The reason the tone of Møller and Jensby might be familiar is because it is 
the same sentences word for word35, though reshuffled, from the DCA main policy paper 
(2004). In terms of deconstruction the deviation from from the policy paper can only be 
found in the lack of stabilisation per se. Otherwise it occupies the same connection as the 
DCA main did. Mainly the need for increase in livelihood and development, alongside 
the improvement of the security situation, and the disclaimer of the international crisis 
management being a purely military task.
They go on to write;  “It is therefore crucial to strengthen the interplay between the  
Danish  civilian  and  military  efforts  in  the  world's  hot  spots.  The  Danish  civilian  
humanitarian effort and rebuilding effort is at the forefront of a better future for the  
population in the focus area. … The government wishes with its initiative also to shorten  
the military operations as much as possible. … Military operations can be necessary,  
and it is important that they are followed by a solid civilian effort,  so that the most  
35 ”Crisis” in the DCA main 2004, are ”conflict” in Møller & Jensby 2004
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efficient use of the Danish resources are ensured” (Møller & Jensby 2004). The need to 
ensure the (re)establishment of utilities and administration are elaborated further;  “The 
objective  is  to  secure  a fast  effort  which  accommodate  the  elementary  needs  of  the  
population. This applies to e.g. access to food, blankets and medicine. But it can also be  
aid  which  contributes  more  directly  to  a  normalisation  of  the  life  for  the  civilian  
population  in  the  area.  This  can  be  the  re-establishment  of  health  clinics,  schools,  
police, justice system, and administration. Or re-establishment of buildings, water and  
power supply,  along with support to civilian relief  organisations.”  (Møller & Jensby 
2004) This articulates an emphasis on the need for relief aid, development assistance, 
detached  from  military  involvement,  and  hails  the  use  of  humanitarian  action  and 
development effort as a key ingredient for the local population. It also echoes the need 
for a shortening of the military operations, as well as the cost benefit in regard to the 
Danish resources.
A large discussion is made in the public perception of the DCA (which constitutes the 
public discourse), as to how much development the military can undertake. As well as 
how close a relationship the NGOs of relief and development aid, can have with the 
Danish military, whilst maintaining the integrity, legitimacy and mandate of the NGOs. 
And there are roughly two camps to the latter. One argues that as the development and 
relief aid NGOs are partly funded through public funds, they should more or less fall in 
line as support the political line of the government and operational need of the military. 
The other argues that the NGOs need to maintain they neutrality and the “arm's length 
principle” in order to operate. The debate of what the DCA is supposed to be is central in 
the  public  perception  discourse,  in  that  it  reveals  what  the  chosen  privileged  actors 
expect the DCA to be able to accomplish. 
There are also arguments as to the military role as a provider of development, which is 
somewhat  curled  later  on,  as  the  role  is  adjusted  so  that  the  military only do force 
protection operations and aid in military capacity building.
Ulla Tørnæs, who became the Minister of Development in 2005, articulated in 2008 that 
the importance of the DCA was in the interconnection and causality of security and 
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development,  where  there  must  be  security  to  create  successful  development,  and 
without development the security can not be reached. “The development effort must be  
launched parallel to the military operation. Only then can the foundation for a stable  
and sustainable development happen” (Gade & Tørnæs 2008). This was also echoed in 
2010 by Lene  Espersen,  Gitte  Lillelund  Bech,  and Søren  Pind (Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  Defence,  and  Development)  ”Security  and  development  are  inextricably  
connected – with the one, the other are nought” (Espersen et al. 2010).
Tørnæs  argues;  “Stability  and  security  is  crucial  for  the  social  and  economical  
development  getting  stated”  (Tørnæs  2005).  However  she  renounces  the  use  of  an 
“armed relief aid brigade” because; “The core competence of the defence is to stabilise  
the  security  situation.  I  would  like  to  personally  emphasise  that  the  DCA does  not  
promote a fusion of civil and military, but it is an indication for will to optimise the  
collective effort” (Tørnæs 2005)
Tørnæs  also  address  a  central  discussion  in  the  public  perception  which  is;  “When 
considering neutrality, can a NGO then continuously be regarded as neutral, when its  
activities  are  financed by a government,  which  in  the  case of  Iraq,  have  a  military  
presence?” (Tørnæs 2005) Which is contested as Danish Red Cross opted out of any 
cooperation with the military in conflict situations, whilst the Finnish Red Cross argued 
that there were no problem in terms of financing and neutrality, and the Danish Refugee 
Counsel saw no problem in planing and educating the military prior to missions. (Tørnæs 
2005)
The interesting meaning to derive from Tørnæs' contribution are twofold. Firstly are the 
interconnection between stability and development highlighted, and emphasised that the 
military only can and should handle the stabilisation. Secondly, it shows an annoyance 
with the NGOs attitude toward the collaboration,  as these NGOs take issue with the 
proposed increase in governmental interference in what they see as their affairs.
Nicolas T. Veicherts, a lieutenant-cononel in the Danish defence, fellow at the Danish 
Defence Academy, and avid contributor the DCA debate, though features in newspapers 
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and academic articles through his work at DIIS36. He argues, under the title; “How can 
we ensure long-term stability” on the motives of the DCA, that;  “The background is  
simple: Military forces can not win the war alone,  when the objectives are stability,  
sustainable development and democracy in the long term, without the involvement of a  
complementary civilian effort.” The connotations are, that the military are equipped to 
win wars, but adding stabilisation, development and democracy creation,  lies beyond 
military capability.
He also notes, that the need to maintain constituency in Denmark, are a key element in  
the DCA. On the importance of the DCA, as a counter for the antagonistic insurgencies 
towards the military; “A factor especially which in relations to the loss of human lives,  
(soldiers  as  well  as  civilian  [expatriates])  also  take  a  toil  on  the  support  from the  
domestic population of the Western countries” (Veicherts 2007). The importance of this 
narrative is, that the mission or objectives in itself does not hold a sole position in the 
DCA, but the DCA is used as a card to be played towards the domestic constituency. 
This  position  is  backed  up  in  an  interview  of  Holger  K.  Nielsen,  who  was  the 
international political spokesperson for Socialistisk Folkeparti; “He [Nielsen] underlines  
that is was the very argument, that through a civil-military cooperation and to 'make a  
difference' which has been promoted through the long war in Afghanistan. “It [the war  
and the DCA] has been publicly sold, both by the politicians and the defence. The civil-
military  cooperation  has  been  part  of  the  legitimisation  of  the  whole  effort  in  
Afghanistan”” (Politiken 22.08.12)
Veicherts also articulates a doubt towards the effectiveness and willingness of the NGOs 
to create  or  enforce the aforementioned objectives  of the DCA (stability,  sustainable 
development, and democracy), and suggest a transfer of function to the Danish state.“A 
lot puts suggest that our times interventions and counterinsurgency in the long haul are  
won by civilian means, so why not create functioning civilian staff and planning units,  
who can produce plans for the best civilian effort, supported by the military, instead of  
current, where the military must take the lead, and the civilians lack behind?” (Veicherts 
36 Referenced in the introduction, Veicherts contributed to the analytical evaluation of the DCA in 2008
63
Master Thesis Lars Hededam – 2014
2007).  This  narrative  implies  that  stability  and development  efforts  are  intentionally 
avoided by the NGOs, and instead Veicherts  suggest,  it  might be an idea to transfer 
control of the proceedings to the Danish state.
When in 2007 it was suggested that benchmarking of the DCA effort in Afghanistan, 
would increase its  efficiency and usability a sceptical  Mikkel  Vedby Rasmussen and 
Henrik Breitenbauch  worte; “To create benchmarking demands that it is known within  
which framework the soldiers need to be effective, and on that background create goals  
for the desired effects. To do that, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of  
Defence must at least in this aspect act as a single, learning organisation. But the civil  
servants can not just create their own goals. They have to look at what the international  
community have agreed to with the Afghan government, and look at what our British  
allied requests. But even with that in mind, can objectives of course be created, on basis  
on what the Danes wants to achieve.” (Vedby Rasmussen & Brietenbauch 2007) There 
is an opposition in this narrative, between the extent of the Danish policy-making and 
the need or desire to fall in line with the international community (Gade 2006; Vedby 
Rasmussen & Brietenbauch 2007; Kværnø & Brodersen 2010; Brobyggerne 2012). This 
concern is echoed by Mads Silberg (Captain) who recognises a lack of continuity when 
the  soldiers  are  replaced  every  six  month  in  the  field,  and  a  change  in  immediate 
command and focus, every so often. As the troops change, the Danish staff commands 
change every six month respectively, and the British area command change every second 
year, and the collective general changes every subsequent second year. (Silberg 2013)
An argument  which  resurfaces  is  connected  to  the  push  in  the  DCA for  a  thriving 
business life in the areas of crisis and fragile states. Espersen, Lillelund Bech, and Pind 
argues “It is not enough to insert military forces along side some sporadic economical  
stabilisation efforts and development programme. To be efficient,  the  effort must be  
combined in one collective and integrated effort  .  That is the core of the DCA” and 
“Without a solid economical development with increased prosperity and more jobs, the  
population looses hope for a better future.” (Espersen et al. 2010). 
The inherent logic is, that the stability in the DCA is perceived as a economical stability, 
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which in turn act as an overall stabiliser, allowing military contingent to conclude their 
operations.
In 2012 an evaluation of the DCA policy was initiated on the background from, amongst 
others, the Minister of Development Christian Friis Bach, who saw the DCA as failed in 
its  purpose:  “The  civil-military  cooperation  [in  the  Helmand  province] has  been  
characterised by emergency solutions, which we could have done without, and which  
definitely in some cases have failed. … In the recent years we have seen spendings of up  
to 50 million kroner yearly in the Helmand province on civilian projects, such as school  
construction, infrastructure, and wages to local civil servant – all of which have been  
under military protection” (Politiken 21.08.12). Where the tangible purpose in Møller 
and  Jensby's  articulation  included  a  wide  range  of  development  and  state-building 
efforts, does this hind sight suggest a closer relation to force protection. 
6.1.6.1 Recapitulation on discursive deconstruction of DCA public perception  
The public perception inhabits so many different narratives of the agency in the DCA, of 
what the DCA is supposed to accomplish, and of what security and development entail. 
And the fact that these articulations on the DCA are spread across almost 10 years are 
only reflected when the purpose of the DCA, i.e. what the DCA needs to accomplish, are 
conflicted with the accomplishments as the purpose. That is to say, the articulation that 
the DCA has lived up to the expectations, by making the accomplishments (or failures) 
the expectations, e.g. Holger K. Nielsen list the achievements from Helmand as being in 
line  with  the  purpose,  however  the  overspending.  Espersen  et  al  argues  that  the 
pursuance of the economical stabilisation development and  economical prosperity, and 
its positive impact on stability and conclusion of military operation, is different or at 
least a narrower focus, than Nielsen from 2012 or Møller and Jensby from 2004. Though 
this could be seen as a weakness in analysis or empirical choices, I argue that to the 
strength,  that  the  different  views  from different  sides,  including  ministers,  shows  a 
general lack of coherence in the public discourse.
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The deconstruction of the public  discourse shows some resemblance with the policy 
discourse, which is expectable. But that some of the articulations are identical with those 
of  the  policy  paper,  is  atypical  to  find.  However,  once  again  the  public  perception 
discourse has many avenues into the purpose,  agency and motives of the DCA. The 
purpose is to expand the task of international crisis management, to actors beyond the 
military (Møller & Jensby 2004), to involve private companies, NGOs of relief aid and 
development aid (Møller & Jensby 2004; Tørnæs 2005; Veicherts 2007; Espersen et al 
2010).  The motivation behind this,  is  primarily the causal  connection made between 
security and development (Møller & Jensby 2004; Espersen et al 2010). And building on 
the causality between security and development in areas of conflict,  crisis, or fragile 
states, narratives concerned with relief, emergency, and development aid in order for the 
population to see progress and stability.
However,  stability  does  not  hold  the  same  strong position  in  the  public  perception. 
Mostly  because  it  differs  whether  stability  is  concerned  with  central  state  stability, 
economical stabilisation efforts, or military stability, since all three are articulated across 
the different narratives (Møller & Jensby 2004; Veicherts 2007; Gade & Tørnæs 2008; 
Espersen  et  al  2010).  What  I  find  surprising  in  the  public  discourse,  is  the  strong 
emphasis on economical development, stabilisation, and relief aid, and the more illusive 
nature of stabilisation efforts through state-building are hardly an issue.
There is also a focus on neutrality. It is made clear that the DCA should not equate to  
“armed relief aid brigade” (Tørfis 2005), however Friis Bach points to the DCA action in 
the  Helmand province,  where  the  soldiers  might  not  have  acted  as  armed relief  aid 
brigade,  but  they  did  act  as  an  armed  brigade  protecting  the  development  effort. 
(Politiken 21.08.12). Apart from that, it is the general conception, that soldiers should 
not  engage  in  relief  or  development  aid  operations.  The  neutrality  question  is  also 
engaged towards NGOs, which on one hand is willing to work with the military outside 
the crisis area and accept the Danish financing, but on the other not willing to take the 
risk in the field,  and work alongside the military operations (Tørnæs 2005, Borchert 
2009; Bittmann & Schaar 2012). The discourse also addresses the need for DCA to be 
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exported  (Gade  2006),  while  the  solutions  and  potential  of  the  DCA can  be  found 
through  international  and  over-national  cooperation  and  coordination  (Vedby  & 
Brietenbauch 2007)
Lastly, the public discourse argues that the DCA is created in order to shorten the Danish 
military operations. Apart from being a cost benefit approach, the DCA is also way to 
protect the Danish constituency, due to concerns, that loss of civilians and soldiers will 
undermine the support from the Danish population. (Veicherts 2006, Brobyggerne 2012; 
Politiken 21.08.12)
6.1.7 The subjugated knowledge DCA public discourse  
As  with  the  DCA policy  discourse  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  analysis,  the  use  of 
subjugated  knowledge  analysis  on  the  DCA public  discourse  will,  along  with  the 
security-development  map  of  Stern  and  Öjendal,  allow  an  examination  of  the 
knowledge, practices and discourses, guiding the discourse of the public perception and 
expectation of the DCA.
6.1.7.1 Some kind of stability  
The notion of stabilisation and normalisation were a pretty consistent matter of state-
building, or creating state-like structures, in order to uphold a security level towards to 
population, which should refrain the population and state, from backlashing to insecurity 
and  developmental  regression.  There  are  three  different  outlooks  on  stability  and 
stabilisation efforts in the discourse. One which articulates stability in order as a part of 
an incentive motivated by the idea of a stable central state, good capitalistic economy 
and UN millennium goals. Then another where stability is ensured by development to 
secure the area/state  long term,  as  part  of  an  incentive  motivated by cost/efficiency, 
domestic  constituency nursing,  and anti-foreign  policy.  The  third  is  stability  regards 
security as a containment of threats against the international community and Denmark.
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The  stabilisation  known from the  DCA main  policy  paper  is,  as  earlier  mentioned, 
articulated the  same way through Møller and Jensby in 2004. In this the stabilisation 
equates to the establishment of;  “Water and electricity supply, transport, police, basic  
administration, and a functioning business life and not least schools, are fundamental  
prerequisites for a stabilisation and normalisation of the area” (Møller & Jensby 2004). 
Aside from disaster aid considerations, the main elements in creating stability is central 
state-based, around security sector reforms and governance, which in terms of security-
development  nexus  mapping  have  different  implications.  First  of  all,  this  narrative 
follows the teleological understanding and emphasis on the state as main provider of 
governance  and  vanguard  for  stability.  The  invasive  nature  of  the  DCA (due  to  its 
military, and international crisis management, component) has a strong understanding of 
what development is supposed to be i.e. central state-building, and security which should 
equate to the behaviour of European state formation.  This is a teleological discourse 
which in the name of liberalism determined the livelihood of the people of the focus 
areas (Duffield 2001), as well post-conflict liberal peace (Hettne 2010). In this sense is 
the development as well as the security teleological, because the incentive is stability and 
central state first and foremost.
Stability is also present in the discourse as a way to secure continued support from the 
domestic constituency, best presented by Holger K. Neilsen where the DCA is “part of  
the legitimisation of the whole effort in Afghanistan”, along with Veicherts who factor 
the death toils as a motive of the creation of the DCA. The argument that the DCA is  
mere  distraction  supports  the  anti-foreign  policy argument,  which  as  a  technique  of 
governmentality  places  the  need  to  (pretend  to)  preform  in  front  of  the  domestic 
constituency and the power plays in the international community,  outside the need to 
create tangible tool to solve development problems (Chandler 2007). At the same time it 
plays on securitisation in using governmentality to create a need for security, both in the 
area of crisis, but also domestically (Buur, Jensen & Stepputat 2007; Buzan, Wæver & 
de Wilde 1998).
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6.1.7.2 Globalised problems and humanised development  
The public discourse articulates an awareness of the use of cooperation with other states 
in solving the problems of stability in fragile states. And not just bilateral collaboration 
in comprehensive approaches, but also through super-national organisations such as the 
EU, NATO, and UN. Reasons being that the Danish contribution, however willingly are 
too small to work alone on projects involving both military and development work. So 
the work must be done, as it is, in collaboration with other actors. Both in the planning 
phase and in the field. Although this very collaboration can still need tuning (Silberg),  
there is also a threat comprehension, especially in reference with the NATO alliance, that 
extremism and  terrorism as  result  of  missing  stability,  is  a  potential  security  threat 
towards Denmark (Gade 2006).
The public discourse are touching on the narrative of the humanisation of development. 
It  does  so  in  is  insistence,  as  opposed  to  the  DCA policy  discourse,  on  classic 
developmental  task,  as  part  of  the  DCA.  Insofar  as  the  military  have  secured  the 
provisional stability, towards classical development issues, such as water and sanitation 
(Møller & Jensby 2004). But also a focus beyond stability and state-building efforts, the 
public  discourse  are  concerned  with  issues  of  putting  the  last  first,  and  bottom-up 
development (Tørnæs 2005; Espersen et al. 2010; Chambers 1983). However unclear to 
the boundaries between development by military or military and civilian cooperation in 
the  field.  The  humanisation  could  in  the  interplay  with  security,  be  argued  to  be  a 
securitisation  of  development,  and not  a  humanising  of  development.  It  is  open for 
discussion whether the public discourse falls on one side of the fence, or the other, but I 
would argue that it is another indication of the fragmentation, or many faced nature of 
the exceptions within the  public discourse.
6.2 Discussion
This chapter will discuss the two empirical discourses in terms of their placement in the 
nexus map, and these positions relativity.
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The policy discourse articulate an interest in creating stabilisation and normalisation, to 
shorten the Danish military operation (force protection), to secure the influence in the 
international community, and safeguard against extremism and terrorism in Denmark. 
The  stabilisation  and  normalisation  are  synonymous  with  state-building  efforts.  The 
agency focus of the military are based on a support of military capacity building, and the 
agency for the development side of the DCA are limited to the need for cooperation and 
planing.  Preferably  in  the  planning  phase  for  operations  in  international  crisis 
management, but also as close to military engagement as possible in the field, in terms of 
time and physical distance. Limited by the contingent and legitimacy of the NGOs.
The  public  perception  are  very  must  engage  in  the  question  proximity  of  the 
collaboration  between  the  military  and  the  NGO's,  with  a  focus  on  development 
question. However the emergency aid and development aid, in terms of human security 
and development, are quite present in the public perception, but are very limited in the 
policy  discourse.  The  concern  in  the  public  discourse,  with  the  extent  of  the 
incorporation of development aid and NGOs in military operation, are detached insofar 
as  most  development  NGO work bottom-up and not  with security sector  reforms or 
establishment of central administration. There are also a belief in the public discourse, 
that the NGO sector can, and should (due to finance) come under tighter administration 
to the state, available for military use.
The division in regard to the DCA policy discourse between developmental initiatives, 
and security initiatives are much clearer for the majority of these activities. In terms of 
agency.  There  is  a  clear  understanding  that  what  the  military  do  in  terms  of  force 
protection initiatives, and force protection first and foremost, and might leave a positive 
development impact, however secondary to the force protection. There is also, especially 
in the later part of the discourse, an recognition that what the military do, in regard to 
military capacity building, which are at best development-like behaviour, since it does 
not fall beyond their capabilities or contingent. The division are more absent in the DCA 
public discourse, where the role of the NGOs and that of the military are intertwined, as 
well as the expectation of the possible results of a cooperation, or of military driven 
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development.
There is a heavy reliance on the role of the teleological in both DCA discourses, but 
especially  in  the  policy  discourse,  is  coherent  through  the  narratives.  As  only  the 
globalised  development  and  human  development  are  concerned  with  development 
solutions  regardless  of  state  or  state  status37.  The  policy  discourse  fast  to  make 
assumption that all states which are not stable Western states, are lagging behind and 
should, both in terms of state stability and development catch up. The same goes for the 
public discourse.
Both discourses fall within the broadening characteristics of the security narrative in the 
map,  as  the  stabilisation  objectives  through  the  DCA  are  a  safeguard  towards 
international and Danish security. The humanised security and human development are 
only traceable in the public discourse. The need to put the last first and do bottom-up 
development is a articulated concern, as well as wish to improve human rights. 
The security as impossible and development at an impasse, are difficult to trace in the 
discourses. There is  a recognition in the policy discourse that the DCA are build on 
lessons learned from previous failures of stabilisation, development and state-building. 
However it does make sense, that a policy like the DCA, both in the public discourse and 
in the policy paper discourse, which are made to create security and development, does 
not reject the idea of development or security.
A technique of governmentality can arguably be traced in both discourses. Insofar as the 
willingness of intervention through international liberalism, the DCA in both camps does 
allow for heavy governmentality in the crisis/conflict area or fragile state. The heavy 
focus on both ensuring Danish security from extremism and terrorism, and doing so 
through development and state-building initiatives, are such a securitisation in use of the 
development. Both discourses have incorporated development assistance as a part of the 
37 In theory, since the globalised development seeks to address the development issues on a global scale 
though over- or inter-state organisations, the teleological state is not completely abandoned.
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security toolbox in international crisis management.
Lastly is the globalised security and development very present in both discourses. Both 
in  terms  of  eagerness  to  find  solutions  to  security  and  development  issues,  in  the 
company of other states, and international organisations. But it also in recognition global 
threats, mainly terrorism.
7 Conclusion
The hypothesis of this thesis suggested that the Danish Comprehensive Approach, after 
nearly  a  decade  of  changing  government  and  much  public  debate  and  a  few  re-
evaluations could be understood as the different discourses occupying the same space of 
reality, but resonating with different tunes. This hypothesis were express in the research 
question which tried to solved the puzzle of how the security-development nexus were 
employed through discourses of policy statements and in the public debate.
And it can be concluded that using the security-development nexus map Stern & Öjendal 
provided, the two discourses does have different perception of what the DCA are, as well 
as  different  expectation  to  what  the  DCA can  accomplish.  Even  the  discourses  had 
fragmentations.  The  policy  paper  discourse  have  a  development  over  time,  in  an 
evolutionary way. This stringency can be expected, since the consigner of the policy 
paper  discourse,  roughly  can  be  seen  as  one  actor.  Which  is  the  state.  The  public 
discourse have a   much more  fragmented quality.  Naturally because  of  the different 
actors articulating the discourse over time.
As a constructivist methodology the mapping of the nexus have good merits. Limited to 
six or twelve different narratives, the map does have a limit in use, and could greatly 
benefit from several extensions of its reach. These limitation are a good indicated to the 
result,  where  both  discourses  were  able  to  fit  in  most  boxes.  This  can  be  see  as  a  
weakness of the nexus map, but it can also be good indicator that the discourses of the 
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DCA are expecting a rather large performance. A large performance, which might spread 
the ability of the actors involved in making this policy a reality, a little thin.
It is possible to build on the foundation of this thesis. Either as a way to expand the  
security-development nexus map in order to see the two same discourse in a new and 
more focused map. Alternatively could the discourse be expanded by adding empirical 
material, or adding discourses. E.g. looking into the economical references of the DCA 
could both provide another discourse dimension or narrow the object space of the actors 
involved.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Concerning the state
Understanding the history of the archetypical modern state in understanding the history 
of the contemporary archetypical modern state, we must follow two parallel roads. The 
first one is the development of polities and containers of power, whereas the other road is 
the theoretical works surrounding the issues of the modern state. Adrian Leftwich argues 
in his contribution in “Politics in the developing world” (edit. Burnell and Randall 2008) 
that any collection of humans in societal understanding needs institutions. Institutions as 
a generic term for the collection of rules, norms, procedures and routines, formal as well 
as  informal,  that  are  related  to  any  actions  taken  in  the  society.  These  institutions 
encompasses  everything  within  actions  and  interactions  around  issues  of  social 
behaviour, economical activities and political power relations. (Leftwich 2008: 212) This 
understanding of the complex dynamics of a group can be related as far back, as the 
genesis of human existence. These complex institutions can even be seen on display in 
animal  behaviour  (Johnson  2001;  Mitchell  2009).  The  key  to  understand  the 
contemporary modern state lies within Europe, due to the inverse historically trajectory 
of the subject. The human condition as a society have evolved over the years and the 
societies that preceded became more refined and more complex. The political entities 
became fewer as the the skills and possibilities of bureaucracy became better,  as the 
growth in population and commence allowed (Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983). From the 
fifteenth century Europe had a estimated 500 individual political entities or units, but by 
1900 there were a meagre 25 units left (Leftwich 2008). With the increasing influence 
and execution of the European  Union it could be argued that the number of units are 
approaching one38. 
In 1648 in wake of the Thirty Years War, the Westphalian Peace Treaty were settled and 
the first major step in the modern system of international relations were born. The treaty 
included  elements  such  as  “territoriality,  secularism,  and  reciprocal  recognition” 
(Simpson 2008: 50), which ensured that the Pope and the churches were not able to  
38 Stephen D. Krasner (1999) would suggest that the European states have compromised the hypocrisy of
state sovereignty, by fully or partially handing their sovereignty to the EU, UN and NATO.
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interfere in internal affairs, by the power of the principle of non-intervention. The Peace 
of Westphalia formalised not only the principle of non- ntervention, it also infused the 
concept of state
sovereignty into the fabric of the state (Simpson 2008; Krasner 1999). This agreement
cemented the European states self-image and strengthened at the same time their mutual
perception (Milliken and Krause 2002).
The system was further refined with the 1933 Montevideo Convention, which was an
agreement between the European self-proclaimed states, and that stated further measures
and benchmarks to the requirements of being a state. A permanent population, a defined
territory, a form of administrative effective government, and a capacity to enter into
relations  with  other  states  (Simpson  2008).  The  convention  secured  the  mutual 
recognition
between  the  states,  but  also  in  the  time  of  industrialism,  noted  that  effective 
administrations
were a given, for a state to uphold itself. There are no doubt that the population growth  
and
the economical development of the late nineteenth century made social contracts in the
European societies evident. This was also explained respectively by Weber and Hobbes
later.
The rise of the United Nations and the subsequent charters and declarations it gave way 
to,
sharpened  and  boosted  the  performance  level  of  the  states  already  in  the  “rather 
exclusive
club, the club of sovereign states” (as put by Oyvind Österud, in Simpson 2008), but at 
the
same time and even more so, the pressure on newcomers to preform got increasingly
bigger. After the Cold War being a member of the international society was synonymous
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with membership of the UN, and vice versa.
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